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**Advantage 1 is Innovation —**

**Standards-Setting Organizations** [SSO’s] **are industry members who jointly establish standards for information tech defined by the adoption of standard-essential patents** [SEP’s]**, which are licensed to companies who wish to implement the tech in their product, called implementers, on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory** [FRAND] **terms. Current standards promote price gouging, FRAND enforcement is critical.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

I. Standard Setting and the Competitive Process

The **fundamental economics** in the **information technology** sector, driven by **network effects**, implies that there is **enormous value** associated with establishing compatibility standards. Popular standards include the mobile broadband standards used in cell phones, which are established by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Wi-Fi technology for wireless local area networks, which is enabled by the 802.11 standard established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).4

There are many SSOs, and their rules and procedures differ considerably. In addition to IEEE, leading SSOs include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).5 SSOs generally establish standards by holding a series of committee meetings among industry participants. These meetings culminate in a vote on a technical specification that describes what features or attributes a product must have in order to comply with the standard. Most SSOs are open to all industry participants and seek to operate on a consensus basis, applying certain voting rules. SSOs do not normally engage in patent licensing, nor do they specify how patent royalties will be divided up among patent holders. They leave that to their members, which in some cases form patent pools to address these issues.6

SSOs adopt specific policies relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs).7 These IPR policies are generally intended to enable the SEP holders to obtain reasonable royalties for licensing their patents, while prohibiting them from charging excessive royalties after other industry participants have committed to the standard. At that point, firms committed to implementing the standard— which we call “implementers”—would find it **very costly** to avoid using the patented technology. For this purpose, most SSOs require SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.8

FRAND policies are especially necessary because negotiations between SEP holders and implementers generally **take place only after** the implementers have used and infringed the technologies claimed by the SEPs. Standards involving information and communications technology can involve hundreds or even **thousands of SEPs**, many with **uncertain boundaries** for infringement. In addition, a time lag exists between patent application and patent issuance. For these and other reasons, it is **impractical** for implementers to enter into negotiations for patent licenses with all SEP owners prior to the establishment of a standard and to their implementation of it.9

The fact that patent negotiations generally do not take place until after implementers have used and infringed the technologies has several critical implications. First, at the time of negotiation, implementers are **locked into the standard** and the technologies claimed by the SEPs—that is, the **cost to switch** to an alternative technology or standard at that point—ex post—is **much greater** than it was ex ante, before the patented technology was first included in the standard. Ex post, the patent holder is no longer competing to have its technology included in the standard, nor is it competing to have implementers of the standard use its technology. Instead, because the patent holder owns an asset that is essential to the standard, implementers have no choice but to use the patented technology.

If the standard is commercially successful, implementers are willing to pay a much larger royalty for use of the patented technology than they would have paid ex ante, when the SEP holder faced competition from other technologies. In these circumstances, the SEP holder can be said to have obtained **monopoly power** in the market in which the patented technology is licensed for use in implementing the standard.10

Second, because of lock-in and the implementer’s ongoing infringement, the **potential for litigation looms large** in licensing negotiations. In effect, the parties are negotiating about how to settle an infringement suit, and that negotiation is **heavily influenced** by their predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree. This situation is not unique to SEPs; it arises frequently when firms are faced with patent infringement claims for products they have independently developed or technologies they have inadvertently infringed. Patent law addresses such instances by specifying that patent holders are entitled to “**reasonable royalties**,” defined as the royalties that the parties would have negotiated prior to the infringement and thus prior to lock-in.11 Those hypothetical ex ante royalties reflect the market value of the patent license. Notwithstanding the law’s embrace of this principle, however, as a practical matter, patent holders are **generally able to recover more** than the **ex ante value** of the patent when litigation occurs after the implementers are locked in. Further, negotiations in the shadow of litigation after lock-in tend to **result in royalties in excess** of the ex ante or **market value** of the patented technology.12

Third, the shadow of litigation is **particularly problematic** in the communications and technology sector, in which products typically include hundreds or **thousands** of **patented technologies**. A court-ordered injunction involving such products would deprive the implementer of not only the value of the technology covered by the patent-in-suit, but also the value of the **entire product**.13 Implementers that are forced to bear the risk of an injunction are thus **induced to agree to royalties** greater than those that would be **appropriate** if only the value of the patented technology were at stake. Those royalties **systematically provide** SEP holders with **excessive compensation** in comparison with the benchmark of ex ante royalties.

These implications of lock-in and ex post dealings are well-understood: they represent an example of the **general concept** of **lock-in** and **opportunism** developed by Oliver Williamson.14 The Federal Circuit has also recognized the market distortions caused by the inclusion of patented technologies in public standards and the resulting danger of patent holdup involving SEPs.15

For these and other reasons, the SEP holder has ex post monopoly power that, if left unchecked, would enable it to obtain royalties **far in excess** of the royalties that it could earn in a competitive market.16 To address this common problem and limit ex post opportunism by SEP holders, SSOs typically require participants that own SEPs to make certain FRAND commitments. In particular, by requiring a commitment to license on “fair and reasonable” terms, the FRAND requirement aims to prevent, or at least reduce, the **extent of monopoly pricing** by SEP holders. And by requiring a commitment to license on “nondiscriminatory” terms, the FRAND requirement can prevent SEP holders from **extracting monopoly premiums** by selective licensing or, more important, migrating their monopoly power from the FRAND-regulated market to unregulated standard-implementing product markets by licensing to only one or a few implementers or licensing to selected implementers on discriminatorily favorable terms.

**Patent holdup is accentuated by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in *FTC v. Qualcomm* that permits ICT firms to engage in innovation-stifling conduct with antitrust impunity.**

**Moss 20**, \*Alex Moss is a Staff Attorney on EFF’s intellectual property team, before joining EFF, Alex practiced complex commercial litigation at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in New York and Durie Tangri LLP in San Francisco; (August 26th, 2020, “Throwing Out the FTC's Suit Against Qualcomm Moves Antitrust Law in the Wrong Direction”, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/throwing-out-ftcs-suit-against-qualcomm-moves-antitrust-law-wrong-direction)

Standards can enhance **competition** and **consumer choice**, but they also **massively inflate** the **value** of **patents** deemed **essential** to the standard, and give their owners the power to **sue companies** that implement the standard for **money damages** or **injunctions** to block them from using their SEPs. When standards cover critical features like wireless connectivity, SEP owners wield a huge amount of **“hold-up” power** because their patents allow them to effectively **block access** to the **standard** altogether. That lets them charge **unduly large tolls** to anyone who wants to implement the standard.

To minimize that risk, standard-setting organizations typically require companies that want their patented technology incorporated into a standard to promise in advance to license their SEPs to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. But that promise strikes at a **key tension** between antitrust and patent law: patent owners have **no obligation** to let anyone use technology their patent covers, but to get those technologies incorporated into standards, patent owners usually have to promise that they will give **permission** to anyone who wants to implement the standard as long as they pay a reasonable license fee.

Qualcomm is one of the most **important** and **dominant** companies in the **history** of **wireless** communication standards. It is a multinational conglomerate that has owned patents on every major wireless communication standard since its first CDMA patent in 1985, and it **participates** in the **s**tandard-**s**etting **o**rganization**s** that define those standards. Qualcomm is somewhat unique in that it not only **licenses SEPs**, but also **supplies** the **modem chips** used by a wide range of devices. These include chips that **implement** wireless communication **standards**, which lie at the **heart** of every mobile **computing device**.

Although Qualcomm promised to license its SEPs (including patents essential to CDMA, 3G, 4G, and 5G) on FRAND terms, its conduct has to many looked **unfair**, **unreasonable**, and **highly discriminatory**. In particular, Qualcomm has drawn scrutiny for bundling tens of thousands of patents together—including many that are **not** standard-**essential**—and offering portfolio-only licenses no matter what licensees actually **want** or **need**; refusing to sell modem chips to anyone without a SEP license and threatening to **withhold chips** from companies trying to **negotiate** different license terms; **refusing** to license anyone other than original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs); and insisting on **royalties** calculated as a **percentage** of the **sale price** of a handset sold to end users for hundreds of dollars, despite the minimal contribution of any particular patent to the retail value.

In 2017, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission [sued](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used) Qualcomm for violating both sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in a number of anticompetitive SEP licensing practices. In May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the FTC, identifying numerous instances of Qualcomm’s unlawful, anticompetitive conduct in a comprehensive [233-page opinion](https://www.eff.org/document/ftc-v-qualcomm-district-court-opinion). We were pleased to see the FTC take action and the district court credit the overwhelming evidence that Qualcomm’s conduct is corrosive to market-based competition and threatens to cement Qualcomm’s dominance for years to come.

But this month, a panel of judges from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously [overturned](https://www.eff.org/document/ninth-circuit-opinion-ftc-v-qualcomm) the district court’s decision, reasoning that Qualcomm’s conduct was “hypercompetitive” but not “anticompetitive,” and therefore not a violation of antitrust law. To reach that result, the Ninth Circuit made the patent grant more powerful and antitrust law weaker than ever.

According to the Ninth Circuit, patent owners don’t have a duty to let anyone use what their patent covers, and therefore Qualcomm had no duty to license its SEPs to anyone. But that framing requires **ignoring** the **promises** Qualcomm made to license its SEPs on **reasonable** and **non-discriminatory** terms—promises that courts in this country and around the world have **consistently** enforced. It also means ignoring antitrust principles like the essential facilities doctrine, which limits the ability of a monopolist with **hold-up power** over an **essential facility** (like a port) to **shut out** rivals. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held rather simplistically that a duty to deal could arise only if the monopolist had provided access, and then reversed its policy.

But even when Qualcomm restricted its licensing policies in critical ways, the Ninth Circuit found reasons to approve those restrictions. For example, Qualcomm stopped licensing its patents to chip manufacturers and started licensing them only to OEMs. This had a major benefit: it let Qualcomm charge a much **higher royalty rate** based on the **high retail price** of the end user devices, like smartphones and tablets, that OEMs make and sell. If Qualcomm had continued to license to chip suppliers, its patents would be “**exhausted**” once the chips were sold to OEMs, extinguishing Qualcomm’s right to assert its patents and control how the chips were used.

Patent exhaustion is a century-old doctrine that protects the rights of consumers to use things they buy without getting the patent owner’s permission again and again. Patent exhaustion is important because it **prevents price-gouging**, but also because it protects **space** for **innovation** by letting people **use things** they buy **freely**, including to build innovations of their own. The doctrine thus helps patent law serve its underlying goal—promoting economic **growth** and **innovation**. In other words, the doctrine of exhaustion is baked into the patent grant; it is not optional. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wholeheartedly approved of Qualcomm’s efforts to avoid **exhaustion**—even when that meant **cutting off** access to **previous licensees** (chip-makers) in ways that let Qualcomm charge **far more** in **licensing fees** than its SEPs **could possibly** have **contributed** to the **retail value** of the **final product**.

It makes **no sense** that Qualcomm could **contract around** a fundamental principle like patent **exhaustion**, but at the same time **did not assume** any **antitrust duty** to deal under these circumstances. Worse, it’s **harmful** for the **economy**, **innovation**, and **consumers**. Unfortunately, the kind of harm that antitrust law recognizes is limited to harm affecting “competition” or the “competitive process.” Antitrust law, at least as the Ninth Circuit interprets it, doesn’t do nearly enough to address the **harm** downstream consumers experience when they pay **inflated** prices for high-tech devices, and miss out on **innovation** that might have developed from fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing practices.

We hope the FTC sticks to its guns and asks the Ninth Circuit to go en banc and reconsider this decision. Otherwise, antitrust law will become an even **weaker weapon** against **innovation-stifling conduct** in **technology markets.**

**Weakened antitrust enforcement emboldens firms to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.**

**Hovenkamp 20**, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is also **fragile**. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, but **renege** on them **later** when they can profit by doing so. At least in this particular case, private FRAND enforcement **had not worked** very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to **exclude rivals** and obtain **higher royalties** than FRAND would permit, largely with **impunity**. Other firms will very likely **follow Qualcomm’s lead**. If that happens the **FRAND system** will **fall apart**, doing **irreparable injury** to the modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very least, **diminishing** the **leadership role** of the United States in preserving effective **network competition**.

While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws.

This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.

The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more **difficult to prove**, even in cases where **anticompetitive behavior** and consumer harm **seem clear**.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a **larger extent** have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a **diminished role**. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is **not effectively disciplined** will lead **others** to do the **same thing**.

**A trusted and credible system for ICT innovation is critical to rapid tech diffusion and economic growth---absent FRAND, the system will collapse.**

**Bauer et al. 17**, \*Matthias Bauer is Senior Economist at ECIPE; \*Fredrik Erixon is a Swedish economist and writer. He has been the Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) ever since its start in 2006; (October 2017, “Standard Essential Patents and the Quest for Faster Diffusion of Technology”, https://ecipe.org/publications/standard-essential-patents/)

It is easy to take a **pessimistic view** about whether the system will **break**. If the current trend continues, the system is **likely** to break at **some point** for the simple reason that companies will **not trust it** anymore. The series of legal disputes witnessed over the past years – sometimes referred to as the “smartphone patent wars” – has been fodder for a pessimistic reading of “the two tales of SEPs”. While it is common in the business world that disputes over patents and licenses are settled in courts, various SEP disputes have revealed **problematic** aspects of the SEP market that are different from those disputes that follow the normal stream of business and contracts. Often, the SEP disputes are less concerned about the rights and boundaries of patents, and more about **antitrust limits** to market **behavior**: they concern market **abusive practices** and **restrictions** to **competition** as much as they are about intellectual property.

If the SEP system actually **does break** at some point, the consequences would be **felt** throughout the **economy**. SEPs have been a **critical part** of the ICT revolution. SEPs have allowed for the **fast rates** of innovation **diffusion** that the world has witnessed over the **past quarter** of a **century**. All the computer and Internet related products and services that people are now dependent upon for their private and professional lives are **intricate webs** of intellectual property. As many as 250,000 patents can be used to claim ownership of some technical specification or design element in a single smartphone (NYT 2012). A laptop, suggests one calculation, implements more than 250 interoperability standards (Biddle et al. 2010), and the number of SEP holders for 3G and 4G standards grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013 while the number of SEPs rose from fewer than 150 in 1994 to more than 150,000 in 2013 (Galetovic and Gupta 2016). The standardization-body ETSI has registered more than 150,000 declarations of SEPs from companies, and ETSI is just one of many bodies in the world of ICT standardization. For the 3G standard, the same body has about 24,000 patents that have been declared essential. Now, with the economy yet again on the **threshold** of big technological change, a **trusted** and **credible system** for creators and users of technology to standardize proprietary technology would be a boon for **innovation**, **interoperability** and – ultimately – the **consumers**.

And there are reasons for optimism. Although many of the problems in the SEP regimes need to be addressed, the numbers above indicate that the SEP system is in fact attractive to patent holders and SEP implementers. It is easy to see why: neither holders nor implementers are presented with alternative options that on the face of it would be far more profitable for them. In other words, there simply would not be as many patents declared as essential if both creators and users of technology believed the SEP system worked to their disadvantage or was grossly unfair. While the reality for some companies may be that legal disputes and unpredictability prompt them to find other ways than SEPs to get access to key technologies for their products, it remains the case that most stakeholders have strong economic incentives to maintain a balanced SEP system that is trusted.

First, standard essential patents are an asset for creators of technology because, by becoming **essential** to a standard, their volumes of sales for technologies that users value rise **significantly**. As many holders want to raise more revenues for their SEPs and – ideally – have the freedom to contract with buyers on their terms, they can expand their customer base when they agree to sell patented technology in accordance with a set of rules that are designed to prevent SEP holders exploiting the weakness of a customer that has grown dependent on having access to their technology.

Second, SEPs are hugely **beneficial** also to those that buy the licenses – the implementers or users. Through the SEP system, they can access technologies that are **interoperable** and work with different **products** and **functionalities** – and they can do it under conditions that, if history is a guide, in most cases give them stable and predictable terms of contract. As a consequence, both creators and users can focus on their competitive advantages and profit on the economies of scale and specialization. Downstream firms do not need to develop their own upstream technology and upstream firms do not need to package their technologies in end-customer products in order to make their products valuable.

Third, standard-setting organisations (SSOs) also have a big stake in an SEP system that works well – and, like creators and users of technology, they would stand to lose significantly if the SEP system were to collapse.

Lastly, the biggest beneficiaries are individual consumers – those who buy the end products using FRAND-conditioned SEPs. The advent of SEPs and the rules represented by FRAND have enabled a **development** of fast technology creation and contributed to the **rapid diffusion** in ICT goods and ICT-based services. The SEP system has also allowed for new competition, both between existing technologies and brands, and from new ones that have stepped into the market with the ambition to disrupt it, again to the benefit of the consumer. It is **difficult** to imagine that the ICT and digital **development** would have been as **fast** as it has been if SEPs had not been a **central feature** of the **market**.

The changing fortunes of companies operating in the cellular and smartphone market would not have been possible if there had not been an SEP system that supported competition. Now that the **world economy** is on the **doorstep** of new innovations that are dependent on a great number of input technologies – e.g. the Internet-of-Things, transport connectivity and intelligent vehicles – it is **crucially important** for the consumer that a **balanced** and **functioning** SEP system is maintained and that actors in the system **converge** towards it – which would ultimately **meet** their **economic interests**.

**ICT innovation is key to post-COVID economic recovery and long-term growth.**

**van Ark 21**, \*Bart van Ark is a Senior Advisor of the Economy, Strategy and Finance (ESF) Center at The Conference Board; Bart van Ark, \*Klaas de Vries is an economist with The Conference Board; \*Abdul Erumban is an assistant professor at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands and a senior research fellow at The Conference Board; (2021, “HOW TO NOT MISS A PRODUCTIVITY REVIVAL ONCE AGAIN”, https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/nie.2020.49)

Introduction

As the global economy has entered recession in 2020, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the human casualties, and economic **damage** are perceived to be **very large**. Even as the health crisis will gradually become manageable, the impact on economic growth can be **long-lasting** and the recovery path can take several **years**. In particular, growth drivers such as the pace of job creation, income generation and investment may take several years to get back to pre-crisis trends. Initially the productivity of those growth drivers may be of less concern as the mantra of ‘we’ll do what it takes to avoid worse’ is predominant in this phase of the crisis.

However, once the recovery gets underway the **productive** use of **resources** is key to **sustained** growth. While we do not ignore the short-term challenges of the economic recovery, our primary focus in this paper is on the productivity puzzle from a **long-term** perspective. Productivity is driven by technological **change** and **innovation** which, in turn, depends on **investment** in human and physical capital as well as in other ‘missing capitals’ often referred to as intangible assets. Indeed, those investments create a **positive feedback** effect, as the productivity it generates also helps to make more **efficient** usage of **scarce** resources in the future. When properly measured and valued, productivity also provides a critical yardstick to realise a fairer distribution of the gains from economic growth to those who bring the resources to bear. It thereby creates the incentives for people to produce and business to invest helping to drive economic growth and raise living standards.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many economies around the world, especially advanced economies, have failed to recharge the economy by powering productivity as the key source of growth in the long term. Indeed the latest update of The Conference Board Total Economy Database (July 2020) points at significant weakening in labor productivity growth in Europe up to 2019 (figure 1a–c). While the United States experienced somewhat faster productivity growth from 2017 to 2019 than the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, it still has **not recovered** to the rates of productivity growth from before the global financial crisis either.

The slowdown in productivity growth over the past 15 years has been well documented. There are multiple causes including an exhaustion of catch-up potential in emerging markets impacting economies along entire global value chains, and the drag from the global financial crisis because of low demand and weak investment, too low interest rates causing misallocations an overreliance on cheap labor, and failing fiscal policies (Bauer et al., 2020; Cette et al., 2016; Crafts, 2018; Dieppe, 2020; Fernald et al., 2017; Syverson, 2016).1 Technical measurement issues regarding inputs and outputs may have played a role as well.

In our earlier work we have stressed the importance of time lags in the adoption of new technologies, and in particular the complexity in generating productivity growth from the latest round of new digital technologies since the early 2010s, including the move toward mobile, ubiquitous access to broadband, the rise of cloud storage and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics (van Ark, 2016a, 2016b; van Ark and O’Mahony, 2016; van Ark et al., 2016).

While the first priority for economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is to restore jobs, it is important that any employment-intensive growth path does go together with a **productivity revival**. In this paper, we argue that it is possible to avoid another productivity **slowdown**. Underneath the aggregate figures, there is evidence pointing toward a possible **tipping point** at which many advanced economies may expect to see more **widespread** impacts from the adoption and absorption of **digital technology** on **productivity** and GDP **growth**.

In Section 2 we review the latest literature on the productivity impacts of general purpose technologies (GPTs), including the notion of time lapses through which digital technologies result in faster productivity growth. We also look at patterns by which innovation and productivity effects GPTs emerge across industries and disperse across the economy. We explain why the New Digital Economy (NDE) is especially characterised by long lag effects.

In Section 3 we provide an empirical analysis of productivity growth by industry data to observe whether we can detect a distinct pattern across groups of industries pointing to a structural improvement in recent years. We use a taxonomy on digital intensity by industry which was recently developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Calvino et al., 2018), showing that the most digital-intensive industries have experienced a relatively strong performance in terms of labor productivity growth since 2007 and especially since 2013.

In Section 4 of the paper, we discuss the connection between labor and skills in the digital economy, which we believe provides the key to a productivity revival. We developed a new metric on innovation competencies by occupation on the basis of data from the O\*Net database on occupation-specific descriptors in the United States (Hao et al., 2018). When applied to the United Kingdom, we find that innovation competencies point at stronger productivity effects by industry.

In Section 5 we focus on how productivity has been behaving in the short-term during the COVID-19 recession. In particular, we address the potential trade-offs between traditional pro-cyclical recovery effects and scarring effects the recession leaves, especially on the labor market. We argue that increased adoption and usage of digital technologies during the COVID-19 crisis may create a positive productivity effect. In the final section, Section 6, we will review our hypothesis that a productivity revival could be imminent in the light of the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. In order **not to miss** this **opportunity** again, as happened a decade ago, we argue that a coordinated effort from business and policy is needed, and has to be delivered in such a way that the gains from productivity will be more **widespread** and such that those who provide the resources for growth are incentivised to deliver them in an efficient way.

2. The productivity paradox of the New Digital Economy

It is well known that General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), defined as new methods of producing and inventing new goods and services which are important enough to have a long-term aggregate impact on the economy, can take a significant amount of time to translate to faster **productivity** growth at the **aggregate level** of the economy. This is inherent to the three critical characteristics of a GPT as identified by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).2

1. Pervasiveness –The GPT should spread to most sectors.

2. Improvement –The GPT should get better over time and, hence, should keep lowering the costs of its users.

3. Innovation spawning –The GPT should make it easier to invent and produce new products or processes.

Historical analysis has focussed on productivity trends in previous technology phases (Bakker et al., 2019; Crafts, 2004). Recent literature has shown that the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution of the past 50 years can be characterised as a GPT and doesn’t pale with previous GPTs such as steam technology, electricity and the combustion engine. For example, Hempell (2005) concludes that ‘investment in information and communication technologies (ICT) are **closely linked** to **complementary** innovations and are most **productive** in firms with experience from earlier innovations’. In a more recent analysis of the evolution of the Internet, Simcoe (2015) argues that the modularity of the internet has prevented a **fall** in **return** to **investments** in **innovation** by ‘facilitating low-cost **adaptation** of a shared general-purpose technology to the demands of heterogeneous applications’. In a review of the data, Liao et al. (2016) conclude that:

‘...ICT investment does **contribute** to **productivity** but not in the usual manner –we find a positive (but lagged) ICT effect on technological progress. We argue that for a positive ICT role on growth to actually take place, a period of negative relationship between productivity and ICT investment together with ICT-using sectors’ capacity to learn from the embodied new technology was crucial. In addition, it took a learning period with appropriate complementary co-inventions for the new ICT-capital to become effective and its gains to be realised. Our findings provide **solid**, further **empirical evidence** to support ICT as a general purpose technology’.

**Growth solves nuclear war.**

**Henricksen 17**, \*Thomas H., emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; (March 23rd, 2017, “Post-American World Order,” Hoover Institution, <http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order>)

What Is To Be Done?

The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in  “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union.

What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and **economically strong**, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ **hawkish behavior** that might otherwise trigger a **major conflict**. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic **chess match** with Russia and China will prove **tense** and **demanding**—since all the countries boast **nuclear arms** and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously.

There can be **little room** for **error** in **fraught crises** among **nuclear-weaponized** and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a **waiting game** in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a **collapse**, as happened to the Soviet Union.

Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain **similar** thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a **systemic contest**, which will test the competitors’ **economic** and **political institutions**.

At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and **economic growth**, as well as sufficient military force to **keep at bay** aggressive states or **prevail** over them if ever a war breaks out.

**Emergence of smart cities depends on IoT applications of 5G interoperability standards---absent FRAND, excessive royalties will undermine sustainable development.**

**Schwartz 18**, \*Matt Schwartz, Privacy Fellowship Coordinator at ACT, App Association; (March 2nd, 2018, “It’s Smart to be FRANDly: How the FRAND Commitment Will Determine the Future of Smart Cities”, https://actonline.org/2018/03/02/its-smart-to-be-frandly-how-the-frand-commitment-will-determine-the-future-of-smart-cities/)

In December, we [outlined](https://actonline.org/2017/12/18/smart-cities-connecting-your-community-through-technology/%5d) the emergence of **Smart Cities** – cities that harness technological **innovations** like internet of things (**IoT**) devices and data analytics to improve essential infrastructure in growing urban centers. The technological foundation of Smart Cities aims to improve public safety, better allocate resources, and meet the needs of citizens more quickly.

A central element to Smart Cities is the comprehensive network of sensors and devices implemented within buildings, roads, traffic signs, and parking meters that allows them to interact with public, and potentially private-owned, infrastructure. These sensors will “speak” to one another, communicating information about energy usage, traffic density, or other elements of city management that have traditionally either been analyzed separately or not tracked at all. The potential of Smart Cities allows data to flow from previously disconnected branches of the city and be processed in real-time, unlocking previously unknown insights.

The powerful **interoperability** of Smart Cities will rely heavily on **standardized technologies** developed in organizations like the IEEE, which is responsible for standardizing the wi-fi technology we use every day. Standardized technologies often include standard-essential patents (**SEPs**), which, like their name suggests, are patents declared essential to an industry standard by a standards-setting organization. In simple terms, one cannot implement the standardized technology without using the patent.

Like regular patents, the users of SEPs must pay royalties or **licensing fees** to the patent owner before they may use it. For example, if a manufacturing company wants to make an IoT device interoperable with a 5G network, the manufacturer must pay a licensing fee to the owner of the SEP that is essential to the 5G standard. SEPs play a **vital role** in the new innovations we enjoy and have come to expect, and because of the value of these patents, SEP holders have the ability to demand **high license fees** from those who wish to implement the standard. To offset this **competition issue**, many SEP holders **voluntarily** agree to license their SEPs to any willing licensee under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (**FRAND**) terms.

While wi-fi and LTE are standards that will be vital to Smart City deployment, countless new standardized technologies are being developed that will be integral to any fully-operational Smart City. With **reasonable access** to SEPs, assured by the FRAND commitment, innovators can enjoy the **legal** and **business certainty** they need to **compete**. While the meaning of the FRAND commitment continues to be refined – as evidenced by the development of SEP best practices recently launched by the App Association in Europe – its foundations are well-established.

But what happens when SEP holders do not abide by the FRAND licensing commitment, or simply refuse to license at all? Sadly, small and medium-sized companies would be **forced** to accept **untenable** licensing terms, but more realistically, they would be **priced out** of using the standard **altogether**. As a result, it would impose a **barrier** to **innovation** that would result in **fewer products** offered to consumers or cities eager to implement **IoT technologies**. For example, many hope the rise of autonomous vehicles will be seamlessly integrated into the Smart City network. But how beneficial would it be if only some autonomous vehicle brands are able to license the technology needed to communicate with traffic lights, simply because of the market power of a chipmaker? The FRAND commitment is an important backstop to that unfortunate possibility.

It is vital for SEP holders to honor FRAND licensing terms, if not for small and medium-sized innovators, then for the sustainability of future Smart Cities. FRAND creates a platform for innovation, providing a floor on which companies can stand, innovate, and compete. If the foundation of the FRAND commitment is reneged, American innovators pay a **steep price** – not only do they lose a **key component** of product **development** and **market entry**, but they are also left with years of expensive negotiations and litigation if they choose to challenge the licensing practice. What’s more, the **confidence** developed in the open standards development system is **shaken**, and Smart Cities have fewer choices in IoT solutions for their future.

To achieve the promise of Smart Cities, a balanced standards ecosystem is essential. We must allow small and medium-sized developers to **leverage industry standards** for innovation and prevent cost-prohibitive royalty structures and negotiating practices that are **detrimental** to **competition**, while also ensuring that SEP owners can protect their intellectual property and be fairly compensated for its use. The FRAND commitment continues to be the **best framework** to achieve this balance, and **adherence** to its **principles** will determine the **future** and **success** of **Smart Cities**.

**Climate change is anthropogenic and causes extinction---5G-enabled smart cities are critical for mitigation and adaptation.**

**Huseien 21**, \*Ghasan Fahim Huseien is a research fellow at Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; Dr. Kwok Wei Shah is presently an assistant professor and deputy program director with the Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; (August 23rd, 2021, “Potential Applications of 5G Network Technology for Climate Change Control: A Scoping Review of Singapore”, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9720)

Currently, the **entire planet** is at risk due to continual **climate change** [1–3]. The recorded increase in average temperature across the world in the past hundred years, and the associated changes attributed to this, are known as global warming. Many scientists are convinced by the published evidence that this change is **anthropogenic** and resulted from the **elevated emission levels** of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) [4,5]. Gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone are responsible for the absorption and emission of thermal radiation. These changes in the relative quantities of the GHGs induce a proportional change in the amount of preserved solar energy. Presently, the accepted indicator for global warming is the sustained rise in the mean temperature worldwide. This definition is designed to account for the fact that there may be some localized exceptions to this rise. For example, there may be cooling experienced in a region while the global temperature may increase altogether, hence the need for average temperature. A key concern with the GHGs trapping of more heat in the atmosphere is that it affects both climate and short scale weather patterns. Consequently, it results in **greater numbers** of **adverse weather events** such as storms, heat waves, cold snaps, droughts, and fires [6]. **Climate-related risks** to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human safety, and economic growth are projected to **increase** with global warming of 1.5 ◦C [7] and further increase further at 2 ◦C, as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the risks to global aggregated economic growth due to the climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5 ◦C than at 2 ◦C by the end of this century.

Carbon dioxide has the most **substantial effect** on global warming [8]. Although it was once assumed to have an ~100 year lifespan in the atmosphere, careful studies revealed that the situation is far worse, with three-quarters of the gas expected to remain for a time in the region of up to ~1000 years, with the remainder lasting for an indefinite period of time [9]. It was indicated that the present impacts of humanity on the atmosphere can certainly cause a long term problem [10]. Carbon dioxide is released when oil, coal, and other fossil fuels are burnt for the energy we use to power our homes, cars, and smartphones. By **lessening** its **usage**, we can **curb** our own **contribution** to climate change while saving money. The first challenge is eliminating the burning of coal, oil, and, eventually, natural gas. Oil is the lubricant of the global economy as it is hidden inside such ubiquitous items as plastic and corn, fundamental to the transportation of both consumers and goods. Coal is the substrate, supplying roughly half of the electricity worldwide, a percentage that is likely to grow according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). In fact, buildings contribute up to 43% of all the greenhouse gas emissions worldwide [11], even though investing in thicker insulation and other cost-effective as well as temperature-regulating strategies can save money in the long run. Investment in **new infrastructures**, or radical **upgradation** of the existing highways and transmission lines, may help to **reduce** greenhouse gas **emissions**, yielding economic growth in the developing countries.

Nations across the globe have kept very **high targets** to reducing their GHG discharges [12,13]. In order to meet these goals, **considerable reductions** in city energy usage is required. At a global scale, urban communities represent over half (55%) of the population, which is predicted to reach **68%** by the middle of this century [14]. Urban areas claim ownership of the **highest levels** of energy use, gas emission, and also the largest local economy. As such, it is **crucial** for urban areas to **reduce** their **consumption** and utilize **renewable sources** wherever available to reduce their gas discharge levels. Smart cities often utilize **digital sensors** to measure and transmit data about the levels of GHGs in the city at that moment, as a means of tackling them [15]. The **efficacy** of such a system is thus **reliant** on the network used to collate and analyze the data collected as an extant network. The mobile telecommunications networks offer a **convenient solution** to this desire, as their pre-existence has the clear benefit of reducing costs compared to the design and implementation of a novel system. It is recognized that smart cities will certainly act as the key players meeting these ambitious targets [16,17]. In this study, we focused primarily on the potential applications of 5G network technology to control climate change in Singapore. In addition, a **clear overview** of the **sustainability benefits** of introducing **5G** technology **compatible** smart cities, buildings, and farms in all aspects of urbanization is provided. Herein, the main purpose is to tackle the **negative outcomes** associated with **anthropogenic climate change**, with a particular focus on the contributions that are best made by the telecoms network operators.

Climate change is one of the most **challenging problems** that humanity has ever faced. Presently, hundreds of millions of lives, innumerable species, entire ecosystems, health, economy, and the **future habitability of this planet** are at risk. Fortunately, climate change is **solvable**, we just need to **wisely exploit** the **existing technologies** and **sciences**. Climate change mitigation is a pressing international need in which many management actions are required. The development of 5G technology has been largely driven by smart mobile devices and advanced communication technologies. It may thus serve as a **technical enabler** for a whole new range of business opportunities, energy, and facilities management, together with industrial applications. Moreover, it may enable different devices to work together seamlessly. Definitely, the 5G cellular network technology is expected to **revolutionize** the **global industries** with **profound effects** on the savings of energy, waste generation and recycling, and water resources management, thus **reducing** the **climate change impacts**.

**1AC — Cybersecurity**

**Advantage 2 is Cybersecurity —**

**Aggressive patent strategies create structural flaws in 5G standardization that imperils domestic cybersecurity---market competition reduces the incidence of vulnerability and severity of attacks.**

**Duan 20**, \*Charles Duan is a senior fellow and associate director of tech & innovation policy at the R Street Institute, where he focuses his research on intellectual property issues; (2020, “OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY”, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, 36(4), 369-405. Retrieved from <https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/monopolies-monocultures-intersection-patents/docview/2442966690/se-2?accountid=14556>)

III. COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY

In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national security is to consider the role of **cybersecurity**. There is little doubt that computer system vulnerabilities that enable **hacking** and **spread** of **computer exploits** are a **threat** to the **nation’s defenses**, so better cybersecurity is a **key part** of national security strategy.155

**Strong competition** can thus **complement** national security by enhancing domestic cybersecurity, and **patent assertion** that **unduly weakens** competition **detracts** from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity. Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a “monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We need **competition** and **multiple providers**, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture,” to **guarantee** national security.157 Thus, cybersecurity provides a **useful lens** for understanding how **unfettered** patent assertion and **licensing** can **detract** from **national security**.

A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add

Competition enhances national security by **reducing** the **incidence** of technical **vulnerabilities**. That effect is **especially important** for security **sensitive systems** such as **mobile telecommunications**.

Intuitively, a **causal chain** from **competition** to **cybersecurity** makes logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less **external impetus** to **test products** for flaws, and the **monopolist** may **choose** to **focus less** on **security** and more on new product features or increased product quality.

Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that the **presence** of more **competitors** correlated with **faster cybersecurity** response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the “**inclination** to **share information** and **invest** in **security technologies** increases as the **degree** of **competitiveness** in an industry increases.”161 Another study found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be willing to take on **some degree** of **risk** and **responsibility** for cybersecurity, whereas a monopoly software firm will **consistently fail** to accept such responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues, but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to cybersecurity.

It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will **lack incentives** to **respond** to **vulnerabilities**, to **share information** about cybersecurity practices and issues, and to **take responsibility** for security matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures already.164 **The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain.**

B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures”

A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that monopoly leads to a “**monoculture**” of single-vendor products, opening the door to **massive** systemic **failure** in the case of a **cyberattack**. Computer researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s, in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has a commanding share of users, a virus that **exploits** a **flaw** in that system can quickly **spread** to **infect** a whole **interconnected ecosystem**. An operating system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that **supports** a collection of **heterogeneous network** elements for the same **functional capability** offers a **greater possibility** of **surviving** security **attacks** as compared to **homogeneous networks**.”167

There has been considerable study of the theory that computer monocultures are **naturally** more **vulnerable** to attacks.168 In one study, computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast, different versions of a single software product were found to share vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share **exploitable flaws** even when there is some **variation** in **versions** across the **monoculture**; by contrast, diversity in software is almost **guaranteed** to **prevent** a **single flaw** from **affecting** all **users**.

In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture is an **especially concerning** possibility. To the extent that systems such as smart city sensors or communication networks are **widely deployed** in a monoculture fashion, a **widespread attack** could have **devastating** consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called “**rootkits**” or “**backdoors**”—maliciously installed software that enable **bad actors** to commandeer systems—could also enable **mass surveillance** or **spying** by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from **multiple vendors** would mitigate these possibilities.

The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes **unwarranted costs** on firms who must **forego** economies of scale and devise seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those concerns **largely focus** on the situation where a **single firm** produces and manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are **avoided** where **heterogeneity** arises **naturally** through **competition** between two **unrelated** firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial diversity techniques are often **insufficient** because they must make **assumptions** about what **aspects** of the **technology** are **most vulnerable** to **attack**, and they **concede** that artificial diversity **cannot stop** attacks involving operation of **legitimate** software functions in **undesirable** ways (sending spam emails or deleting document files, for example).176

It is widely recognized that a monoculture is **unavoidable** in at least one respect: Most connected devices will need to **conform** to technical **standards**.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A **flaw** in any such standard would render **all mobile devices** implementing the standard **vulnerable** to an **identical attack**.179 Avoiding these sorts of **systemic flaws** in standards requires rigorous **development**, **analysis**, and **testing** of the standard in the development process, which in turn requires ensuring that **as many firms** as **possible**, especially firms that share basic American values, are **involved** in the **development** of those **standards**.180 Thus, the necessary **standardization** of **information** and **communication technologies** is perhaps the most **important reason** why a **competitive** communication technology **market** is **essential** to **cybersecurity** and national security.

**Insecure technical standards cause inevitable systemic grid collapse---extinction.**

**DeNardis 21**, \*Dr. Laura DeNardis, PhD in Science and Technology Studies from Virginia Tech, Dean of the School of Communication at American University, and Gordon M. Goldstein, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, (March 1st, 2021, “The Real Lesson of the Texas Power Debacle”, Lawfare, 3/1/2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/real-lesson-texas-power-debacle)

The infrastructure was essential, ubiquitous and providing basic functionality for everything in daily life from water to heat and transportation. And in an instant it was gone, plunging tens of thousands of residents into a life-threatening crisis. This is, of course, the narrative of the recent debacle in Texas, where a winter storm overwhelmed the state’s electrical grid and brought the state to a near-total blackout. But it should also be interpreted as a preemptive **warning** of what Americans will face from the next generation of the **internet** and the new realm of cybersecurity risk it will **dramatically** amplify.

Both forms of infrastructure—a state-run electrical grid and the **5G** and “**internet of things**” future to which we are rapidly hurtling—share three attributes. First, their construction reflects a lack of imagination about the danger that can quickly **coalesce** when seemingly remote threat scenarios become real. Second, compounding a lack of analytic imagination is an absence of preparedness. Third, for both the Texas electrical grid and the emerging internet, public policy protections are either meager or completely absent.

In planning for the resilience of its electrical grid, public officials in Texas **discounted** the potentially devastating disruption that could occur from **unpredictable** events—whether related to climate change or just a once-a-century anomaly. They also eschewed precautions other states take seriously by allowing for the interconnection of electrical grid supply chains across their borders, ostensibly because of their ideological rejection of federal regulatory oversight governing such arrangements.

As the United States builds out a new national **5G** cyber-physical communications network through private service providers, Americans similarly **discount** the **risks**—myriad in their diversity and severity—that are **orders** of **magnitude** more **significant** than what Texas confronted recently. More physical things than people are already connected. The super empowered internet of tomorrow, known among some in the field as the “internet of everything,” will exceed by **tens of billions** of devices the number of connections between individuals simply communicating via social media or digital screens.

This confronts policymakers with an imminent threat: A cyber outage is **no longer** about losing digital communications but about losing basic **societal functioning** and even **human life**. The failure of imagination is to think of the SolarWinds attack on U.S. federal agencies and tech companies as a **worst-case scenario**. The failure of imagination is to think of cybersecurity through a content-centric lens rather than as possible attacks on the material world. The emergence of internet-connected cardiac devices, digitally dependent cars, and internet-connected agriculture systems portend the stakes of a cyberattack to **health care**, economic and **social functioning**, and **food security.**

The United States should be prepared for, and certainly not be caught by surprise by, such cyberattacks. Yet, the internet of everything is notoriously **insecure**. Internet-connected physical objects are not necessarily upgradeable. Nor do they come with adequate default security and encryption. The 5G infrastructure that helps connect digital objects has been at the center of debates over Chinese espionage. Industrial cyber-physical **systems** are based on **technical standards** that have not been collaboratively vetted for **security** and **interoperability**. One of the most infamous cyberattacks—the so-called Mirai botnet that took down major media sites and corporations—hijacked these insecure objects in homes to carry out the assault. The United States is not yet prepared.

Finally, in the race to conceive and deploy effective public policy responses, the U.S. government as a whole is hardly more anticipatory or synthesized in its response to potential calamity than the state of Texas. The focus of U.S. cyber policy remains on information policy issues such as disinformation, manipulation and violent speech rather than securing the digital world that now powers our material day-to-day lives. The Biden administration confronts an enormous challenge in crafting a comprehensive strategy to the cybersecurity risks foreshadowed by the ruinous experience in Texas and its management of vital infrastructure. While the digital world has leapt from two-dimensional to three-dimensional space, cyber policy has not at all jumped from 2D to 3D.

This failure of imagination, preparedness and policy protection must not be America’s cyber future; the stakes are far **too high** and the costs are far **too great.** The Texas disaster is a potent illustration of what has always been true: Our digital society and economy are extremely vulnerable and grow more porous and subject to penetration day by day. As digital sensors and cyber control systems become further embedded in physical infrastructure like energy systems, agriculture and transportation, there is no longer a separation between security of the **“real” world** and security of the **online world**. They are **entangled** and increasingly **enmeshed**—and policy has yet to catch up to either envisioning or mitigating the looming threats the U.S. confronts.

If the energy grid cannot weather a winter storm, how can it be expected to withstand a major cyberattack? What other vital forms of national infrastructure—ranging from water, bridges, highways and roads, and ultimately our day-to-day financial system—are **comparably** at **risk**? As Texas dramatizes, it is neither **hyperbolic** nor **exaggerated** to assert that **our survival** could now depend on **securing** the inevitable **cyber-physical future** that is accelerating with **stunning rapidity**.

#### Cyberwar is increasingly likely---SolarWind emboldens hackers to undermine critical infrastructure and nuclear supply chains.

Bajema 21, \*Dr. Natasha Bajema is the Director of the [Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks](https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/programs/csw/dr-natasha-bajema/) and an IEEE Spectrum contributor. She has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration; (March 24th, 2021, “Today's Cyberattacks Foreshadow Wars to Come”, https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/aerospace/military/todays-cyberattacks-foreshadow-wars-to-come)

Cyberattacks are no longer just a matter of cybersecurity, they directly threaten a country’s national security. Cyberattacks alter the character of warfare—much like nuclear weapons once did, allowing adversaries to potentially cross enemy lines to harm large numbers of innocent civilians.

Today’s malicious actors can now seek to cause physical damage from remote locations through digital channels, wreaking devastation on a country at levels that previously would have required a kinetic attack.

On February 8, 2021, hackers breached the Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Fla. using known software vulnerabilities in an attempt to poison the local water supply with sodium hydroxide—also known as lye. They accessed the plant through its industrial control system (ICS)—a system designed to allow for remote control and supervision of the plant. Taking over the plant’s controls, hackers increased parts of the chemical, used to [adjust the acidity and remove metals from drinking water](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack), to one hundred times over the normal level. The system used an [old version of Windows, was accessible with a shared password, and had no firewall protection against intrusions](https://techgenix.com/florida-water-treatment-facility-cyberattack/). Thankfully, [a supervisor noticed the dangerous change in time whilst working remotely](https://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Cyberattack-on-Water-Treatment-Facility-Suggests-More-to-Come.html), averting a crisis that may have caused chemical burns and blindness among those exposed to the toxic chemical.

U.S. government officials have recently expressed concerns about similar vulnerabilities across water and energy sectors and other critical infrastructure including [health, emergency services, food and agriculture, and transportation systems](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack). The cyberattack on the water plant occurred just a week before a major winter storm led to a widespread blackout and water crisis across Texas. [More than five million](https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outage-blackouts/) went without power and running water for several days, illustrating the fragility of such interconnected infrastructure and the physical devastation that could be caused in the event of a cyberattack targeting the grid.

Critical infrastructure is not alone in its vulnerabilities to cyberattacks with physical implications—supply chains are also at risk. For at least a span of months (if not years), hackers have [exploited vulnerabilities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_federal_government_data_breach) in software from Microsoft, VMWare and the Texas-based company [SolarWinds](https://www.solarwinds.com/) to compromise data security in at least 200 organizations in the U.S. government and other agencies around the world.

Although the SolarWinds attack appears to be a [case of classic espionage by Russia](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) via the U.S. supply chain, there are aspects of the attack that also illustrate the potential for achieving physical effects via digital channels. As early as [March 2020](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands), Russian hackers breached the Orion network management software designed by SolarWinds, a federal contractor, and planted malicious code likely intended to gain access to sensitive information. Evidence of malware was first detected [in December by a cybersecurity company](https://www.newsweek.com/colorado-representative-says-solarwinds-hack-could-cyber-equivalent-pearl-harbor-1555994) that also uses the Orion software. The impact of the SolarWinds cyberattack spanned [thousands of networks](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) at [nine federal agencies and 100 private sector companies](https://www.cyberscoop.com/solarwinds-cyber-espionage-russia-neuberger/), including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for overseeing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Although NNSA claims there was no impact to classified systems, officials found [evidence of attempted intrusion](http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/22/nuclear-weapons-agency-congress-hacking-450184) in unclassified systems—although, according to the NNSA Public Affairs office, the system in question was used for business purposes, not for transport of nuclear weapons and materials. The agency also detected attempts to gain access to servers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—one of three nuclear weapons labs. [NNSA immediately disconnected the software from relevant networks](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-update-cyber-incident-related-solar-winds-compromise), removing the possibility for deleterious effects. While hackers were not likely targeting the transport of nuclear weapons, the [vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons](https://www.nap.edu/read/11538/chapter/6#112) [while en-route](https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1409912) [between secure locations](https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1348_web.pdf) are well known.

The exact objectives for the SolarWinds cyberattack remain unclear, but the vast extent of its reach may demonstrate to U.S. adversaries the significant potential of cyberattacks for achieving physical ends, including the possibility of stealing nuclear weapons. However, the incident is not the first major one from which malicious actors have deduced such capabilities—[consider the lessons from the NotPetya attack in 2017](https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/it/notpetya-latest-ransomware-is-a-warning-note-from-the-future). Russian hackers spread malicious code through a popular accounting software developed by a Ukrainian business across many countries in Europe, eventually infecting tens of thousands of computers around the world. In addition to rendering infected computers useless, the attack shut down the global operations of the Maersk shipping company and caused major traffic congestion on the roads near ports in the United States. It also slowed operations of Merck & Co, Inc., a major producer of drugs and vaccines in the U.S., [reducing production capacity for a short period of time](https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/merck-has-hardened-its-defenses-against-cyber-attacks-like-one-last-year-cost-it). Even a classic espionage or sabotage incident may carry significant potential for physical damage.

The [Biden administration has already issued guidance](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/) for shoring up vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains, but much more needs to be done to protect critical infrastructure and dissuade malicious actors from exploiting digital channels to achieve physical ends. In an era of hybrid and gray zone warfare, cyberattacks are attractive to nations seeking to undermine their adversaries due to challenges of attribution and the associated benefit of deniability. In the future, these nations may also come to see cyberattacks with physical effects as a new form of warfare—a Trojan horse in the form of their adversary’s own infrastructure or supply chains. In so doing, they can cross enemy lines and cause damage and destruction without defeating any military forces.

**Actors have the means and motivations to strike critical infrastructure.**

**Wintch 21**, \*Timothy M. Wintch, an active-duty Major in the United States Air Force. He is currently a graduate student at the Oettinger School of Science & Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University, in Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Wintch has over 11 years of experience in command-and-control operations as an Air Battle Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University. (April 20th, 2021, “PERSPECTIVE: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on”, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/)

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is **so vital** because it provides the energy necessary to run **every other** critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly **vulnerable** every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to **cyber** intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an **appealing** target because of the disproportionally **large impact** even a **small attack** can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[[1]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn1) Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the **dispersed** nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[[2]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn2) From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[[3]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn3) Terrorists have the **motivation** to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

One nation that has shown both the **capability** and **intent** to use attacks against critical energy infrastructure is Russia, as demonstrated in their 2015 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. A Russian cyber threat group known as Sandworm, which used its BlackEnergy malware, attacked Ukrainian computer systems that provide remote control of the Ukraine power grid.[[4]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn4) This attack, and another in 2016, each left the capital Kiev without power, prompting cyber experts to raise concern about the same malware already existing in NATO and the U.S. power grids.[[5]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn5) In any conflict between Russia and NATO, not only would similar cyberattacks pose a threat, but so would potential physical attacks severing fuel oil and natural gas lines to Western Europe. Russia has both the capability and intent to attack critical infrastructure, particularly power grids, during future conflicts in their “hybrid warfare” approach.

Another nation that has the capability to attack critical energy infrastructure is China, representing a threat to not just the U.S. energy infrastructure but also that of our allies whose support would be vital in a major conflict. A recent NATO report highlighted this threat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stating that “[China’s] foreign direct investment in strategic sectors [such as energy generation and distribution] …raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”[[6]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn6) Like Russia, China has been **active** with cyber **intrusions** in U.S. energy **infrastructure**. The Mission Support Center at Idaho National Laboratory characterized these as attacks as “multiple intrusions into US ICS/SCADA [Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] and smart grid tools [that] may be aimed more at intellectual property theft and gathering intelligence to bolster their own infrastructure, but it is likely that they are also using these intrusions to develop capabilities to attack the [**bulk** electric system], as well.”[[7]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn7) China, therefore, has both the **capability** and **intent** to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks for myriad reasons.

Another arm of this threat is the reliance the U.S. energy industry has on imports from China, especially transformers. In early 2020, federal officials seized a transformer in the port of Houston that had been imported by the Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company before sending it to Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. Sandia is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy for mitigating national security threats.[[8]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn8) The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mike Howard, chief executive of the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded technical organization, said that the diversion of a huge, expensive transformer is so unusual – in his experience, unprecedented – that it suggests officials had significant security concerns.”[[9]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn9) Previously destined for the Washington Area Power Administration’s Ault, Colo., substation, the transformer is believed to have been seized due to “backdoor” exploitable hardware emplaced by the Chinese prior to shipment.[[10]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn10) Shortly after these events, President Trump issued Executive Order 13920, “[Securing the United States Bulk-Power System](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/),” essentially limiting the import of Chinese-built critical energy infrastructure components due to concerns about cybersecurity.[[11]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn11) Interestingly, Jiangsu Huapeng “boasted that it supported 10 percent of New York City’s electricity load.”[[12]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn12)

Franklin Kramer, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce subcommittee during an energy and power hearing in 2011 and said that a “highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, or blended attack on the **bulk power** system, however, could result in long-term (**irreparable**) damage to key system components in multiple simultaneous or near-**simultaneous strikes**.” He added that “an outage could result with the potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large population centers to lose power for **extended** periods.”[[13]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn13) Even the inclusion of features such as smart grids to the overall grid structure poses new **vulnerabilities** through their connectivity. Kramer stated that “such connectivity means that the **distribution** system could be a **key vector** for a national security attack on the grid.”[[14]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn14)

**Those attacks cause accidental nuclear escalation.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of **cyberstrikes** and **counterstrikes** against **vital national infrastructure** rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key **economic systems**, such as **power grids**, **financial systems**, and **transportation networks**. As noted, Russia has **infiltrated** the U.S. **electrical grid**, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.[12](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.[13](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12)

The danger here is that **economic attacks** of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an **escalating series** of **tit-for-tat attacks** against ever more **vital elements** of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing **widespread chaos** and **harm** and eventually leading one side to initiate **kinetic attacks** on **critical** military **targets**, risking the **slippery slope** to **nuclear conflict**. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”[14](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote14)

These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by **third parties**, such as **proxy states** or **terrorist organizations**, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing **early-warning systems** to generate **false readings** (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a **clear indication** of the **severity** of the **threat**. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the **dangers** of **unintended** or **accidental escalation** can only grow more **severe**.

**Cyber-compromised NC3 causes nuclear war.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>)

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are **heavily dependent** on **computers** and other **digital processors** for virtually **every aspect** of their **operation** and because those systems are **highly vulnerable** to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of **communications** and **data-processing** systems, all reliant on **cyberspace**. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be **communicated** to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and **communicate** chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves **operations** in **cyberspace**, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek **vulnerabilities** to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread **cyberespionage** to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to **interfere** in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for **recruiting** combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to **extort money** from banks, municipalities, and individuals.[4](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote04) Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the **whole system** itself is **dependent** to a **considerable degree** on the **electrical grid**, which itself is **vulnerable** to cyberattack and is far **less protected**. Experienced “**cyberwarriors**” of every major power have been working for years to probe for **weaknesses** in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (**malware**) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.[5](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote05)

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major **nuclear powers**, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established **extensive** cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in **offensive cyberoperations** on a **regular basis**, often aimed at **critical** military **infrastructure**. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.[6](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote06)

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.[7](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote07) Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by **strategic rivals of** the United States to **infiltrate** and eventually **degrade** U.S. **nuclear infrastructure** are far **less documented** but thought to be **no less prevalent**. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted **malware** in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of **cutting off** the **flow** of **electricity** to critical **NC3 facilities** in the event of a major crisis.[8](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote08) Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have **crafted cyberweapons** aimed at critical **NC3 components** and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.[9](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote09)

The first and possibly most **dangerous path** to **escalation** would arise from the **early use** of **cyberweapons** in a great power **crisis** to ~~paralyze~~ **undermine** the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “**fog of war**” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, **fearing** the **loss** of its own **arsenal**, **launch** its weapons **immediately**. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have **overwhelming incentives** to go **early** with **offensive** cyber and counter-space **capabilities** to **negate** the other side’s military capabilities or **advantages**.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge **military** and **coercive advantage** for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the **prelude** to a **full-scale attack** aimed at **neutralizing** its **nuclear capabilities** and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”[10](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote10)

What makes the insertion of **latent malware** in an adversary’s NC3 systems so **dangerous** is that it may not even **need** to be **activated** to **increase** the **risk** of **nuclear escalation**. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might **not trust** the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might **misconstrue** the **nature** of an **enemy attack**, leading them to **overreact** and possibly **launch** their **nuclear weapons** out of **fear** they are at **risk** of a **preemptive strike**.

“The **uncertainty** caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could **jeopardize** the **credibility** of the **nuclear deterrent** and **undermine strategic stability** in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a **flaw** or **malicious code** into nuclear weapons through the **supply chain** that **compromises** the **effectiveness** of those **weapons** could lead to a **lack** of **confidence** in the **nuclear deterrent**,” undermining strategic stability.[11](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote11) Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

**1AC — Plan**

**Plan: The United States federal judiciary should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards.**

**1AC — Solvency**

**Solvency —**

**The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that strengthens FRAND effectiveness while enabling SEP holders to capture appropriate royalties---which is the best competition-innovation balance.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles

The antitrust principle is **straightforward**: industry-wide collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive standards is **permitted** only if it is **no more restrictive** of competition than **reasonably necessary** to enable creation of the standards. When standard setting predictably creates technology **monopolies** that, if unrestrained, will enable **anticompetitive** ex post **opportunism** that would otherwise not occur, an SSO that **does not** take **effective** measures to prevent or minimize such ex post opportunism engages in conduct that is **more restrictive** of competition than necessary. In that case, the SSO and, in appropriate cases, its members, may well **violate Section 1** of the **Sherman Act**.

Under this principle, SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be **evaluated** based on whether they lead to **reasonable** SEP **royalties**, using the competitive ex ante licensing standard discussed above, which has been **adopted** by the courts in patent law. Put differently, FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining **more** than the **ex ante value** of their **technology** from implementers.

This limitation **would not** prevent a SEP holder from **proﬁting**, perhaps **greatly**, from participating in the SSO and having its patented technology included in the standard. The SEP holder **continues** to be **rewarded** for its technology because the inclusion of its technology in the standard can still **greatly increase** the volume of licensing opportunities available to the SEP holder.

Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, the case would probably be structured as an ordinary **Rule of Reason** case.82

First, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate **harm** to **competition** as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, many of which compete with one another. In this case, the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise **monopoly** power by obtaining royalties in **excess** of the **competitive**, ex ante level. The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly **unlawful** agreement. Notably, the court **need not** determine what a FRAND royalty is; it would **suffice** to **determine** that **market power** has been **created** or **exercised**, and that existing SSO rules and policies were **not adequate** to prevent the competitive harm. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.

Second, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition, the **defendant(s)** would then have to show some **procompetitive justiﬁcation**— in this case, the **beneﬁts** of the standard. These two initial steps should be straightforward.

Third, if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justiﬁcation, the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available, reasonable **alternatives** to realize the **efficiency beneﬁts** with less or **none** of the competitive **harms**. The plaintiff might identify reasonable **alternatives** that would have led to a **different** standard, based on including **unpatented** technology in the standard or perhaps involving **fewer SEPs** or **fewer owners** of SEPs, which would be **less subject** to patent holdup. More likely, the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would not change the standard, but would **reduce** the **likelihood** or extent of ex post **opportunism**. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.

Fourth, the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the beneﬁts of the standard **could not** have been **realized** if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered **alternatives** or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those beneﬁts could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.

Our overall sense, based on experience and the empirical literature, is that the extant FRAND rules are generally useful, but tend to be **inadequate** because they are **imprecise** and leave **unresolved** such critical issues as (a) the meaning of a **reasonable** royalty, even conceptually; (b) the meaning of “**non-discriminatory**;” (c) to whom licenses must be offered; and (d) under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction.84 These **imprecise** FRAND commitments are therefore **not sufficient** to adequately prevent ex post opportunism. The recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy represent a signiﬁcant step in the right direction, but even this advance leaves important questions **unanswered**.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the ﬁnal, fourth step. The defendant would be able to **demonstrate** the **beneﬁts** created by the standard; the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the **creation** of **market power** and that other reasonable and practical rules or policies would **ameliorate** the problem. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that signiﬁcant beneﬁts associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.

The court would have **available** a **variety** of **possible remedies** if the plaintiff prevails. Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies would be **entitled** to **damages** and, in some cases, to **treble damages**.86 If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the **collective action** of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, SSO members would be **jointly** and **severally liable** for the damages. Forward-looking injunctive relief aimed at restoring competition would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case. For example, a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, it might give the SSO a period of time—maybe ninety days—to develop a rule, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, the court might order the parties to attempt to **negotiate** a **rule** or policy on which they can agree. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.

**Threatening antitrust liability lures SSO’s into adopting best practices.**

**Lemley & Shapiro 13**, \*Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor at Stanford Law School and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley and a Senior Consultant at Charles River Associates; (2013, “A SIMPLE APPROACH TO SETTING REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS”, (https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf)

Under our approach, many of these issues should become moot, since the patentee cannot obtain an injunction (or transfer the patent to someone who can) against a willing licensee, and since competitors are not involved in jointly setting the reasonable royalty rate. If SSOs set clear, reasonable rules following the best practices we recommend, and parties follow those rules, there should be **little** or **no need** for **antitrust** to **intervene**. Indeed, even the risk of non-disclosure of a patent is lessened, since the patentee has committed to license its essential patents whether or not it discloses them. For the most part, the rules we have described are **self-executing**, meaning that even if a party tries to break the rules set by the SSO there still may be no need for antitrust to intervene. Thus, we suggest that **parties** who **abide** by these **procedures**—patentees, implementers, and the SSOs themselves—should be **immune** from **antitrust liability** for activities that merely follow those rules.107 They have entered into an arrangement that is **on balance good** for **competition**, one that allows patentees to receive **reasonable royalties** but **prevents holdup** and **reduces** the risk of **monopolization** by **trickery**.

The fact that antitrust remains a last resort available when SSOs don’t follow best practices may have two practical benefits, however. First, under our approach the **promise** of **avoiding** the risk of **antitrust liability** will be a **powerful incentive** for both SSOs and patent owners to **adopt** the **best practices** we propose. Second, the risk of antitrust liability may be relevant when an individual patentee wants to adopt best practices but the SSO governing the standard has not yet done so. We propose that a patentee that unilaterally commits to the FRAND procedures we describe here should be immune from antitrust liability for following these procedures.108 A patentee’s unilateral binding commitment to arbitration could be enforced whether or not it was elicited by an SSO. Thus, just as the prospect of antitrust immunity might **lure SSOs** to **adopt best practices**, it might also lure **patentees** to **implement** those **practices** even if the SSO has not done so. Given the large number of standard-essential patents based on preexisting standards,109 and given that SSOs tend to update their IP rules rather slowly,110 this is **not** a **small matter**.

**Only antitrust enforcement creates a consumer-action feature that counterbalances SSO’s conspiratorial incentives---private action fails.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, <https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf>)

2. Why Antitrust Enforcement Is Necessary

Some SSO members have an interest in ensuring that the SSO takes steps to minimize the potential harms from the SEP holders’ monopoly power, and this undoubtedly explains in part why most SSOs have adopted FRAND policies or similar requirements. But, as shown in the economic model in the Appendix,73 SSOs **cannot** in general **be counted on** to adopt effective FRAND policies. The bases for this conclusion, which is central to our argument for the applicability of Section 1 to SSO FRAND rules, can be summarized as follows.74

First, the SSO members **collectively have an interest** in permitting SEP holders to charge supracompetitive royalties that elevate the downstream price of compliant devices to the monopoly level. Doing so will enable the members **in aggregate** to collect **increased revenues** from consumers, and thus to generate **increased profits** that in theory could be **shared by all** the members. In other words, supracompetitive royalties can enrich industry participants as a group at the expense of final consumers. This fact alone should serve as a **clear and strong signal** regarding the **dangers** of counting on SSOs to implement effective FRAND policies: if the SSO members negotiate **efficiently**, the outcome will be **just as bad** for consumers as if the members agreed to **fix downstream prices**.75 The **fundamental problem** is that **final consumers** are **not at the table** when the SSO rules are negotiated.

Second, SSO members that own SEPs but earn little or no profits as implementers have a **powerful self-interest** in being able to exercise the ex post monopoly power associated with their SEPs. Because SSO policies are usually determined by a **consensus** process, these members will likely be able to **block the adoption** of **fully effective FRAND policies**. Moreover, these SSO members often have the greatest interest in SSO patent policies. Since much of their income may be attributable to patent licensing, they can be expected to devote substantial resources to block the adoption of FRAND policies that effectively prevent patent holdup.

Third, even SSO members that earn **significant profits** as implementers may have **mixed incentives** if they also own SEPs, which can also lead to **weak or in-effective FRAND rules**. In the Appendix, we show that, if the **requisite share** of votes in the SSO are cast by firms whose **share of SEP royalties** is at least as large as their share of **downstream profits**, and if these firms can coordinate their voting over the FRAND rules, then an SSO **unconstrained** by antitrust laws will establish FRAND rules leading to an outcome **no better for consumers** than would result from an **integrated monopolist** controlling all SEPs and all downstream sales.76

Fourth, even SSO members that are **downstream implementers** and own few, if any, SEPs may have only a **modest interest** in promoting effective policies to restrict ex post opportunism. Because all implementers will be subject to the opportunism, all of them will face **increased licensing costs**, and therefore will likely be able to **pass on** most or all of the **increased costs** to their customers.77 Furthermore, these implementers might not be **especially active** or **effective** in the standard-setting process for **free-riding** or **public-good** reasons, especially if SEP royalties constitute only a **relatively small portion** of the costs of their standard-implementing products. Public choice theory predicts that the highly motivated SEP holders are likely to have the **greatest influence** over **patent policies**.

Empirical evidence bears out these concerns. As a starting point, we find it striking that SSO FRAND rules are almost **always quite vague**.78 Notably, SSOs in which SEP holders are more prevalent tend to have weaker FRAND rules.79 Further, to our knowledge, SSOs have made almost **no effort** to enforce their FRAND rules and have, instead, **left enforcement** efforts to **others**.80 This evidence raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the existing FRAND rules in preventing ex post opportunism.

#### Antitrust is critical---the broad standing and available remedies afforded are vastly superior to any other types of law.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

III. CONCLUSION

Patent holdup where a patentee has deceived an SSO in order to secure a position in the standard is, at its core, an antitrust problem. In this context, patent holders harm consumers by exploiting the competition-reducing aspects of standard setting to their own private advantage. In addition to being the body of law directed toward anticompetitive conduct, antitrust provides numerous practical advantages, including the possibility of governmental enforcement, and appropriately broad standing.

Remedying the patent holdup problem exclusively through non-antitrust legal remedies would be perverse. Indeed, it would be a bit like remedying patent infringement through the doctrine of common law conversion. In some instances, it might work, but there certainly would be under-enforcement.

To be sure, there are instances where deceptive conduct by the patentee does not harm competition and, in those instances, there is no antitrust claim. Often there will be patent remedies in that situation, or contract or even tort remedies. The legal regimes can and do coexist peacefully.

Those who argue that the marginal benefit of antitrust remedies do not out-weigh the cost of antitrust litigation both understate the benefits (broad standing and ready remedies where appropriate) and overstate the costs (the potential, however unknown, of “false positives,” i.e., condemning behavior that is not anticompetitive). In addition to being overstated, the false positives concern is also misplaced in this context. Unlike an antitrust attack on price cutting or a securities offering, the risk of a false positive here is not the over-deterrence of desired behavior, but rather that over-deterrence of deceptive and opportunistic behavior. Fretting about that form of over-deterrence seems itself to be a misallocation of resources. And preventing that form of over-deterrence by reliance on the competitive outcomes under legal regimes not designed to protect competition strikes us as unwise.

#### \*Ex ante disclosure solves lock-in, improves transparency and openness.

Contreras 13, \*Jorge L. Contreras is a Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah with an adjunct appointment in the Department of Human Genetics. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School (JD) and Rice University (BSEE, BA); (Contreras, J. L. (2013). TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND EX ANTE DISCLOSURE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY. Jurimetrics, 53(2), 163-211. Retrieved from https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/technical-standards-ex-ante-disclosure-results/docview/1428261870/se-2?accountid=14556)

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms could potentially alleviate the causes of such disputes by making a patent holder's royalty rate known before lock-in of a standard. Thus, if maximum royalty rates were known in advance, it would be more difficult for an implementer to argue that such rates were unreasonable (as the SDO could have chosen an alternative technology if this were the case).148 Lacking this potential defense against an infringement claim by the patent holder, implementers might be more inclined to negotiate with patent holders before the adoption of a standard. By the same token, if a patent holder knew that its maximum royalty rate would be scrutinized before the approval of a standard, and that SDO participants would be free to consider alternative, less costly technologies, it would have an incentive to disclose a royalty rate that was as reasonable (or low) as possible.149

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms has an intuitive appeal. Like the prices of menu items at a restaurant, it has been argued that the royalty rates for standards-essential patents should be disclosed before product vendors (diners) are locked into costly technology choices. But critics of ex ante disclosure have argued that requiring early disclosure of licensing terms will impede standards-development processes and create additional legal risks for participants. To assess the validity of these complaints, we studied ex ante licensing disclosures at VITA, IEEE and IETF and found no evidence that such policies resulted in measurable negative effects on the number of standards started or adopted, personal time commitments or quality of standards, nor was there compelling evidence that ex ante policies caused the lengthening of time required for standardization or the depression of royalty rates. There was evidence to suggest that the adoption of ex ante policies may have contributed to positive effects observed on some of these variables. In addition, a significant majority of participants in VITA, the only SDO adopting a mandatory ex ante policy, felt that the information elicited by the organization's ex ante policy improved the overall openness and transparency of the standards-development process. Thus, while there are numerous areas in which further study and analysis may be warranted, and other organizations in which the implementation of ex ante policies may have different effects, we concluded that the process-based criticisms of ex ante policies and the predicted negative effects flowing from the adoption of such policies are not supported by the available evidence.

# 2AC

## Adv — Innovation

#### Patent holdup is real and necessitates intervention, even if it can’t be systemically proven.

Contreras 19, \*Jorge Contreras, Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; (2019, “MUCH ADO ABOUT HOLD-UP”, <https://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Contreras.pdf>)

B. Protective Measures May Already Be Working to Reduce Hold-Up

Another important factor that should be considered regarding the purported lack of empirical evidence of systemic hold-up is the effect that existing policy measures have already had in reducing hold-up. As noted above, the threat of patent hold-up was a primary motivating factor for many SDOs to adopt policies requiring the disclosure and licensing of SEPs. These policies have been in place for decades. In the United States, the first such policy was adopted in 1959 by the American Standards Association (the predecessor to today’s American National Standards Institute (ANSI).102 Today, every one of the more than 200 ANSI-accredited developers of American National Standards must adhere to ANSI’s essential requirements, including the adoption of such a licensing policy for SEPs. Similar policies have existed in European and international standards organizations since at least the 1980s.103 These policies, which were developed by SDOs in large part to reduce the likelihood of hold-up within standard-setting systems, have had several decades to work, and it is likely that the lack of observed hold-up in some studies can be attributed to the successful operation of these policies.

Similarly, antitrust and competition enforcement agencies in the U.S. and Europe have been aware of the potential for hold-up connected with standardization for many years. Accordingly, they have brought enforcement actions when it has been alleged that hold-up behavior has resulted in a violation of the antitrust laws. High-profile enforcement actions against patent holders such as Rambus, 104 Google 105 and Qualcomm106 send powerful deterrent signals to the market and warn others not to engage in similar behavior lest they, too, become the subject of agency enforcement. Like SDO policies, it is likely that the general market awareness of agency interest in standard-setting and hold-up has, to a degree, limited the amount of hold-up that is actually attempted in the marketplace, thereby limiting the direct evidence of hold-up as a systemic problem.

But do the deterrent effects of SDO and agency efforts to reduce hold-up signify that hold-up is not a problem? Certainly not. To reach such a conclusion would be perverse: akin to claiming that burglary is not a problem in a neighborhood that experiences reduced burglary rates after it has implemented an active neighborhood watch program and enhanced policing.

C. Indicia of Healthy Markets do not Prove the Absence of Anticompetitive Conduct

As noted above, one of the principal arguments advanced by commentators seeking to refute the “hold-up theory” is that markets for telecommunications products, namely smart phones, are robust – evidenced by increasing product functionality, decreasing consumer prices and rapid innovation -- and that this degree of robustness indicates that hold-up cannot be a problem in these markets.107 If hold-up were a problem in these markets, they reason, we would see product stagnation, stable (but high) prices, and a lack of competition – features associated with classic examples of hold-up in markets for products such as natural resources and agricultural goods.108

But this argument relies on a false syllogism: hold-up results in market dysfunction; if a market functions well, then it cannot be subject to hold-up. The weaknesses in this argument are multifold. First, hold-up may exist in individual instances without sufficient weight to affect overall market characteristics, particularly in a large global market such as mobile telecommunications. Thus hold-up may exist, even in a market that outwardly appears to be functioning well. Second, there is no valid counterfactual to use to compare the health and robustness of the market for mobile telecommunications products.109 Other consumer electronics devices, such as televisions and DVD players, do not compare well with mobile telecommunications devices, which have taken on a unique character in the modern networked economy. Thus, observing the strength of the market fails to answer the critical questions “compared to what?” and how much stronger the market might be (through more product diversity, functionality, price reduction) without hold-up?

A simple historical illustration is useful in this context. During the decade leading up to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, several major U.S. commodity markets (e.g., steel, salt, petroleum, coal, sugar, lead, and others) came under intense scrutiny for a variety of allegedly anticompetitive industrial arrangements. One might have argued that these markets, had they been subject to the sorts of anticompetitive collusion that the Sherman Act sought to address, should have seen reductions of output and increases in price. Yet, between 1880 and 1890, U.S. output of salt, petroleum, steel, and coal all increased significantly, and prices of steel, sugar and lead all dropped significantly.110 Do these positive market indicia demonstrate that the subject markets were not subject to anticompetitive collusion, and that the Sherman Act was not necessary? Certainly, investigations of these industries revealed significant cartel behavior. I would suggest that few commentators today would argue that the coal, steel, sugar and other major industrial producers of the late nineteenth century were innocent of collusive and anticompetitive conduct, or that the Sherman Act was not a necessary and beneficial measure for the U.S. economy.111 Yet, had we relied solely on the positive characteristics exhibited by these markets as proof that anticompetitive conduct did not exist, then perhaps the Sherman Act never would have been enacted.

By the same token, the fact that global markets for standardized products such as computers and smart phones appear to be thriving does not itself refute the possibility of hold-up nor the existence of anticompetitive conduct in these markets. Nor does it allow regulators and policy makers to drop their guard or cease to monitor these important industries.

## Adv — Innovation

## T — IP Law

#### The plan increases the scope of the Sherman Act.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

Antitrust enforcement aimed only at SEP holders is not sufficient to prevent or remedy ex post opportunism. First, as described in Part I, that kind of enforcement must be implemented separately for each patent holder, and for many standards, there are hundreds or even thousands of SEP holders. Second, some of the most common kinds of opportunism are arguably beyond the reach of antitrust claims against SEP holders. 61 Moreover, enforcement aimed at SEP holders is not directed at the basic problem: the failure of the SSOs to take adequate steps to prevent the ex post opportunism that the SSOs’ conduct enabled. There is, therefore, another important role for Section 1 of the Sherman Act to help guard against ex post opportunism by SEP holders—one that the courts have not yet had occasion to recognize. This role is soundly based on well-established Supreme Court precedent regarding the application of Section 1 to activities by SSOs and their members.

## CP — Patent Law

#### A---consumer-action deficit. Patent infringers have attenuated incentives to cough up high royalties because SSO’s can profit in aggregate by passing costs onto consumers---that’s Melamed and Shapiro. That means widening the plaintiff pool beyond implementers is key---which the counterplan CANNOT do.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

One final point about patent remedies concerns standing: it is not just the type of harm that matters to antitrust, but whether anyone has a remedy to address it. Antitrust fills the gap left open by patent law by providing a remedy to those “outsiders”—consumers, competitors and others—who lack standing to seek relief under the patent laws. Consider Qualcomm: The use of equitable estoppel there was only available as a defense asserted by the alleged infringer. The elements of the defense discussed above, moreover, require that the infringer either be involved in the SSO process or have a specific basis for claiming that it was affirmatively misled by the patentee. No consumer injured by the wrongful acquisition of monopoly power in this context would meet these criteria, nor would other firms that have been excluded from the market due to the deception at issue. There is no government enforcement agency to protect such plaintiffs, because patent law has no provision for government enforcement intended to protect consumers from harm to competition.

In sum, the limitations of patent law would exclude many of the categories of potential plaintiffs suffering antitrust injury as a result of standard-setting abuse. We conclude that equitable estoppel is unequal to the task of policing monopolization through fraudulent conduct in the standard-setting process.

#### SSO interests do not align with consumers. Patent law is an insufficient proxy for securing competition.

Speegle 12, \*Adam Speegle, J.D., (May 2012, “Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse on the Standard-Setting Process Setting Process”, https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=mlr)

Even assuming that SSO members are willing and able to engage in litigation with a firm attempting patent holdup, consumer welfare takes a backseat to the members' financial considerations.3 8 Because the incentives of the SSO members do not align with those of consumers, enforcement actions by firms in the private sector cannot be relied on to adequately protect consumers. 39 This concept is illustrated by a practice known as injunction threats, in which a patent holder threatens to bring an injunction against a manufacturer for violating its patent unless the manufacturer pays a substantial royalty.4 ° While the patent holder's threat may have questionable legal footing, the manufacturer will often pay the royalty instead of engaging in extended litigation.4 This happens for several reasons. First, the manufacturer has a disincentive to engage a patent holder in litigation because the manufacturer will bear the cost of the litigation, the result of which could benefit competitors. 42 Companies will tend to pay the royalty and wait for another company to challenge the practice. 43 Second, the costs associated with challenging injunction threats may be substantial." On top of ordinary litigation costs, if the manufacturer has already begun making and distributing goods based on the patented technology, a potential preliminary injunction could have a devastating effect on its business.4 5 While engaging a patent holder in litigation may collaterally benefit consumers in that increased royalties are not passed through to the price of the ultimate product, this benefit does not tip the scales in favor of manufacturers pursuing such a path.' Thus, reliance on litigation by SSO members or other third parties will not provide a complete solution to patent holdup, as these parties serve as poor proxies for consumers.

#### B---targeting deficit---faulting the entire SSO is key to curtail monopolization---targeting individual SEP holders fails.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

Antitrust enforcement aimed only at SEP holders is not sufficient to prevent or remedy ex post opportunism. First, as described in Part I, that kind of enforcement must be implemented separately for each patent holder, and for many standards, there are hundreds or even thousands of SEP holders. Second, some of the most common kinds of opportunism are arguably beyond the reach of antitrust claims against SEP holders. 61 Moreover, enforcement aimed at SEP holders is not directed at the basic problem: the failure of the SSOs to take adequate steps to prevent the ex post opportunism that the SSOs’ conduct enabled.

#### C---deterrence deficit---only antitrust law creates a legitimate cost to misconduct---that’s 1AC Melamed and Shaprio---whereas the loss of a private lawsuit wouldn’t change SEP holder’s calculus.

Tsilikas 17, \*Haris Tsilikas is an IP and Antitrust Consultant, a Doctoral Candidate and Visiting Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich; (2017, Antitrust Enforcement and Standard Essential Patents: Moving beyond the FRAND Commitment”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctv941t01.9.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A92dc720d1ebc7088811b40032a60f575)

Antitrust could play a meaningful role.165 The most important contribution of antitrust enforcement against abuses of SEPs is its deterrent effect.166 Although patent law reforms or contractual binding of subsequent SEPs-holders to FRAND licensing would provide to victims of hold-up useful defences in court, they do not sufficiently deter abusive assertion of SEPs in the first place. For instance, the contractual binding to FRAND could raise counterclaims of breach of contract or/and contractual performance; however, the opportunistic SEP-holder will, in case it loses on such grounds, be left no worse than with a licence on FRAND terms. In the end, a patent hold-up is indeed precluded, but contractual constraints can do little to prevent opportunistic assertion of SEPs in the first place. The victims still suffer the costs of uncertain and resource-draining litigation; most importantly, the reliability of the standards-setting process might still be at risk.

Antitrust enforcement on the other hand, in imposing tortfeasors positive monetary losses in the form of fines, alters the profit-cost calculus of opportunistic behaviour in the first place; opportunistic assertion of SEPs will come at a cost. Of course, a too-heavy-handed approach could have a chilling effect on legitimate patent assertions against implementers that are reluctant to pay FRAND royalties, thus leading to false positives. Antitrust enforcement should carefully examine the specificities of each case, such as the particular PAE conduct, the relationship between PAEs and practicing entities, the structure of downstream markets.167 More importantly, an economically informed antitrust analysis focusing on the actual and potential anticompetitive effects of opportunistic SEPs assertion should prohibit behaviour that is truly harmful to consumers. Safeguarding the inclusive and efficient character of the standards-setting process is a competition law problem. Informed antitrust analysis could provide adequate responses to opportunistic PAE behaviour and privateering.

#### D---litigation deficit---the counterplan limits damages from an infringement suit---that’s NOT sufficient because the threat of litigation alone will cause implementers to cave.

Rubin 17, \*Jonathan Rubin, Partner, Patton Boggs, LLP, Washington, D.C; (May 2017, “PATENTS, ANTITRUST, AND RIVALRY IN STANDARD-  
SETTING”, https://moginrubin.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RutgersRubinVol382.pdf)

One justification put forward for favoring ex ante RAND commitments is that they should require patent holders to “contract out of an injunction- backed property rule, and into a reasonable-royalty liability rule.”107 In other words, ex ante RAND commitments are supposed to adequately protect standard-adopters because a patentee giving such a commitment presumably relinquishes its right to enjoin the adopters’ practice of the standard.108 The belief apparently is that an assurance that the patentee will, at worst, sue for a high level of royalties by forswearing injunctive relief is sufficient to allow standard-setters to adopt patented technology without fear of ex post hold-up.

At least three criticisms can be leveled against this justification for making the RAND commitment the centerpiece of an SSO’s patent policy. First, it applies only to patents that are known or disclosed ex ante and not to the more fundamental problem in which hold-up occurs because the existence of the patent remained unknown until after the standard had been adopted and implemented. The JEDEC policy, for example, did not prevent the hold-up that occurred in Rambus II.

Second, while a waiver of the injunctive remedy is certainly not meaningless, it is difficult to see how it could mean so much. Clearly, the threat of an injunction can be disruptive and may even put an immediate stop to an alleged infringer’s commercial operations. But, the specter of lengthy and costly litigation, the outcome of which could alter the alleged infringer’s fundamental business proposition, is not a negligible prospect for most businesses.

A third reason to be troubled by reliance solely on a voluntary RAND commitment is that it tends to suppress ex ante discussions or negotiations, particularly when coupled with a prohibition that discussions of licensing terms beyond their general description as RAND is not suitable for discussion within the SSO. There is some evidence that both U.S. antitrust agencies are moving toward recognition of the procompetitive potential of ex ante discussions.109 For reasons discussed below, the expansion of ex ante negotiations is likely to be procompetitive and should not be hampered by the mistaken belief that a simple RAND commitment is sufficient.110

#### E---reliance deficit---non-SSO members can’t reasonably prove reliance on non-assertion of a patent.

Kesan et al. 14, \*Jay P. Kesan, Professor and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property and Technology Law, and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Faculty Scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; \*Carol M. Hayes, Research Associate at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Winter 2014, “FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments”, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol89/iss1/10/)

However, detrimental reliance is not perfect either. First, as Mueller notes, it may not be reasonable for parties who are not members of the SSO to rely on a patent owner’s promise to the SSO.[[1]](#footnote-1) In terms of addressing the problem of whether the FRAND commitment binds subsequent owners, detrimental reliance may suffer from the same drawbacks as equitable estoppel and implied licenses as defenses under patent law, because the assignee may have made no representations concerning licensing. And even if the detrimental reliance theory is effective at addressing some SEP licensing problems, it is unclear if the same theory could apply to non-core essential patents, commercially essential patents, or after-acquired patents. Detrimental reliance is also not likely to assist in the case of after-acquired patents, unless the previous owner made a FRAND commitment to the same SSO concerning that patent.

#### Concurrent enforcement by both antitrust and regulatory agencies solves the tradeoff link.

Varney et al. 20, \*Christine A Varney, Julie A North and Margaret Segall D’Amico are partners, and Molly M Jamison is an associate, at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; (October 22nd, 2020, “Antitrust Remedies in Highly Regulated Industries”, https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-059)

Balancing remedies with regulation

As discussed above, there is a wide range of approaches for merger review between antitrust authorities and specialised regulatory agencies. Given the range of different approaches, it is difficult to make generalisations across either agencies or industries. What is clear is that there are certain strengths and weaknesses to a dual merger review and remedy approach. On the one hand, the dual review system has been criticised for its purported inefficiency and added costs of concurrent reviews by two agencies.[[84]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-007) On the other hand, others have touted the importance of consistent antitrust review[[85]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-006) and the avoidance of agency capture that a dual review system can accomplish. So how should antitrust authorities approach mergers in highly regulated industries? Should Congress do away with dual review and grant exclusive merger review jurisdiction to the DOJ or FTC? Or should the regulatory agencies be responsible for merger review and remedies in their areas of expertise? A review of past practices suggests that there is not a single right answer to these questions. However, in the current landscape there are considerations that could mediate some concerns about inefficiency and cost.

First, coordination between the relevant antitrust authority and regulatory agency can facilitate consistent outcomes and ensure that the appropriate remedies are ordered. The most common critique of having both antitrust and regulatory review of mergers is inefficiency. Having two federal agencies both expend time and resources reviewing mergers and imposing remedies is expensive for both taxpayers and the merging entities, and extends the time required to review transactions. Conflicting decisions – where one agency may approve a transaction while the other challenges it – also add to the risk of inefficiency. Better coordination and cooperation can mediate these concerns to an extent.[[86]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-005) As the American Antitrust Institute identified, increased cooperation should be a ‘high priority’, particularly in industries transitioning from regulated to a more competitive free market.[[87]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-004)

Second, antitrust authorities should continue to use regulatory agencies’ strengths to the fullest extent possible to construct appropriate remedies. Regulatory agencies have expert knowledge of the industry and often have access to far more information on the market than the DOJ or FTC would be able to gather on their own. The DOJ and FTC have to rely on receiving information from parties, competitors and customers in the market. Such information is often limited in scope and time period. By contrast, regulatory agencies, such as the FCC and Federal Reserve, have access to information on the market spanning decades and are better able to access necessary information that can save antitrust authorities time and cost. Moreover, regulatory agencies already have the ability to monitor and oversee industry actors. Reliance on the regulatory agencies’ ability to monitor could resolve the frequent concerns about imposing conduct remedies and the use of long-term consent decrees.[[88]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-003) The ability to impose effective conduct remedies may reduce the DOJ and FTC’s reliance on the one-time fix of a structural remedy and open the possibility of more tailored remedies.[[89]](https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-guide-merger-remedies/third-edition/article/antitrust-remedies-in-highly-regulated-industries#footnote-002)

#### And, doesn’t solve advantage 2---market competition is key to cybersecurity---motivates responsible investment and diversifies suppliers---that’s Duan.

#### Public R&D causes crowd-out and impedes private investment.

Marino et al. 16, \*Marianna Marino and Stephane Lhuillery, ICN Business School, Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship; \*Pierpaolo Parrotta and [Davide Sala](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733316300555#!), Aarhus University, Tuborg Research Centre for Globalization and Firms; (June 17th, 2016, “Additionality or crowding-out? An overall evaluation of public R&D subsidy on private R&D expenditure”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733316300555)

6. Discussion and conclusions

This paper is an overall evaluation of the public subsidies to R&D, which proposes an assessment of this policy in absence or combination with the R&D tax credit, an equally important policy instrument used to stimulate private R&D investments. Using a dataset of French companies that covers the period 1993–2009, we perform both inter-group and intra-group assessment of the outcome of this policy. The former analysis is directed to investigate a differentiated impact of R&D grants across differently funded firms, and is presented alongside utilization of the categorical matching method. The latter analysis investigates the implications of the current modulation of public intervention for similarly funded firms. Implemented by means of a continuous treatment evaluation method, the intra-group assessment allows us to investigate the likelihood of crowding-in and crowding-out effects within each tercile along the distribution of the public R&D support grant. Both methods are coupled with the DID approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity and results strengthened by a rich dataset featuring comprehensive information on the pre-treatment variables. In addition, exploiting the exogenous variation due to the sharp change in R&D tax [credit policy](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/credit-policy) that occurred in 2004, we compare [treatment effects](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/causality-analysis) on growth of R&D private expenditure between before- and after-reform periods, and therefore we identify the effects of such a policy change introduced by the government.

Our results show that substitution between private and public funds may occur, especially for medium-high levels of public subsidies, and under the regime of R&D tax credit. Recipients of larger doses appear not to outperform or to perform worse than recipients of lower doses or non-recipient firms. Crowding-out seems stronger and more significant in the after-reform period as reported in both the propensity score and exact matching analysis performed by year. In addition, we find evidence of more extensive negative effects for firms employing fewer than 100 employees or operating in low R&D intensive industries. When analyzing the intra-tercile distribution of public funds under R&D tax credit regime, we highlight a considerable reduction in the growth of private R&D expenditure among medium-high subsidy recipients, whereas additionality effects are found for a few top beneficiary companies (above EUR 10 million). In the sample of fully supported recipients, it seems to emerge – on average – that firms receiving subsidies between EUR 145 thousand and 1.8 million exhibit significant lower private contribution with respect to their counterfactual units. Subsidy-only recipients instead show significant substitution of private with public R&D resources for subsidy doses between EUR 20–55 thousand. Interestingly, when dividing the sample in before- and after-reform periods, we find that crowding-out effects seem to persist solely for recipients of subsidies under tax credit incentives after the 2004 reform.

Overall, our findings appear to suggest a substantial re-design of both the modulation and targeting of the public R&D subsidy policy, especially under R&D tax credit regime. Indeed, the substitution effects emerging from the inter-tercile and funded versus unfunded comparisons would motivate a better targeting of the recipient firms, especially among [small and medium size firms](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/sme) and in low R&D intense industries. Concerning the modulation of the public R&D subsidy provision, it appears opportune to move resources from medium-high to top beneficiary recipients to boost the growth of private R&D expenditure and rise the private contribution to R&D in the economy. Furthermore, the distinction between fully funded from subsidy-only recipient firms underlines the importance of accounting for “hidden treatments” that may otherwise affect the policy evaluation and favor misleading implications. In addition, the 2004 reform of R&D tax credit appears to have lowered the effectiveness of public R&D funding. Although this result shed some lights on the effects of the 2004 reform, it also asks for further research to investigate the opportune mix of such R&D policy tools. Finally, it is worth underlining that a potential limitation of our study is due to the fact that we do not observe companies with fewer than 20 employees in the manufacturing industries, a significant proportion of the French firm population.

This overall assessment indicates that an ex-post evaluation of the targets of an R&D policy is desirable, if not necessary in a time of downturns or economic stagnation. In fact, if R&D funding is seen as a valid policy instrument to support companies hit hard by a crisis and facing financial restrictions, it is inevitable that public resources should not be re-directed away from risky and promising research projects toward companies that would likely perform equally well without this funding.

#### Public R&D investment isn’t enough and can’t compensate for a lack of private industry competitiveness.

Clark 21, \*Laurie Clark is a senior reporter at Tech Monitor. Before this, she held reporting positions at NS Tech, Wired UK and IDG. She holds an undergraduate degree in psychology from UCL and a masters in media and journalism from the University of Glasgow; (June 10th, 2021, “Massive US tech bill needs to aim for more than countering China”, https://techmonitor.ai/policy/massive-us-tech-bill-needs-aim-more-than-countering-china)

One of the meatiest industrial policy bills in US history, the Innovation and Competition Act (ICA) would commit around $250bn in funding for scientific research, earmarking $52bn to shore up the US’s domestic semiconductor industry, and $120bn for investment in technologies such as AI and quantum computing, as well as overseeing an overhaul of the National Science Foundation (NSF). “The ICA will dramatically increase R&D for basic and applied research in the US,” says Sarah Bauerle Danzman, assistant professor of International Studies at Indiana University Bloomington, pointing out that at present, R&D spending in the US is [about .5% of GDP](https://www.aei.org/economics/us-federal-research-spending-is-at-a-60-year-low-should-we-be-concerned/) with the private sector contributing around 70% of that. “If passed, this bill will increase federal R&D spending by about 30% over the next five years.” How will the Innovation and Competition Act impact chip supply? Although the US is the world leader in semiconductor technologies, most of its manufacturing is outsourced to fabrication plants in Asia. A global chip shortage has highlighted the weakness in its supply chains, and China’s plans to [bolster its own domestic production](https://techmonitor.ai/silicon/silicon-cold-war-china-tech-self-sufficiency) abilities have increased calls for the US to bring chip manufacturing back within its borders. While the signposted federal funding was [applauded](https://www.semiconductors.org/senate-passage-of-usica-marks-major-step-toward-enacting-needed-semiconductor-investments/) by the Semiconductor Industry Association – which noted that the share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the US has decreased from 37% in 1990 to 12% today – some remain sceptical that it will be sufficient. “Even a couple of hundred billion US dollars is not enough to bring about a rapid turnaround of the situation as the US sees it,” says Jonathan Liebenau, associate professor in Technology Management at the London School of Economics. “Semiconductor fabrication plants are hugely expensive and the rest of the supply chain that China built up over the past 30 plus years cannot simply be bought off-the-shelf.” He points out that the US doesn’t have the state-owned enterprises or the complex private-public business ecosystem that China does. “We can ramp up spending on research but under current legal, and treaty, conditions we cannot pick national technology champions anymore, we cannot boost chosen tech companies against their direct competitors, even foreign ones.” The US still narrowly leads in AI, but there are forecasts that China could soon take the edge. China itself has set the goal of becoming the world leader in AI [by 2030](https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/2166148/china-2025-artificial-intelligence/index.html). In quantum computing, an area considered to have important national security implications, China is said to be [slightly ahead](https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/China-emerges-as-quantum-tech-leader-while-Biden-vows-to-catch-up) of the US. It has funnelled money into the sector, [spending $10bn](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-08/forget-the-trade-war-china-wants-to-win-the-computing-arms-race) on setting up the world’s largest quantum research facility.

## CP — Congress

#### Permutation do both shields or the counterplan links to the net benefit. Courts can point to the counterplan as justification for the aff.

Durling 17, \*James Durling, a member of the Yale Law School J.D. Class of 2018; (May 1st, 2017, “May Congress Abrogate Stare Decisis by Statute?”, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute)

As suggested in the Introduction,[66](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref66) there may be very good reasons to treat statutory stare decisis differently from constitutional stare decisis.[67](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref67) For example, in the statutory context Congress already has the power to overrule Supreme Court decisions by amending the statute in question[68](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref68)—a power it does not have in the constitutional context. But perhaps more importantly, Congress may also have the power to prescribe rules of statutory interpretation for courts [69](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute#_ftnref69)—a power it probably does not have over constitutional interpretation.[70](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref70) Congress has enacted interpretive rules in Chapter 1 of the U.S. Code, also known as the Dictionary Act, where it prescribes “Rules of Construction.”[71](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref71) Although most of these rules of interpretation might be more accurately described as definitions,[72](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref72) some involve more methodological rules of grammar.[73](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref73) In addition, Congress has codified a few other interpretive rules in scattered sections of the U.S. Code.[74](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref74) Perhaps these interpretive rules themselves violate separation of powers, but such a ruling would certainly conflict with current understandings of Congress’s power over statutory interpretation.[75](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref75) This Essay does not provide an independent defense of interpretive rules; it merely notes that current practice views them as compatible with the judicial power.[76](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref76)

If Congress may overrule decisions interpreting statutes and if it may prescribe rules of statutory interpretation, Congress would also appear to have the power to prescribe a rule of interpretation requiring courts to ignore a past Supreme Court decision. Similar to Paulsen’s approach, this is not to say that courts could not look to the reasoning of prior Supreme Court cases as persuasive authority, but they could not follow the “super-strong presumption” of stare decisis famously invoked in past cases.[77](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref77) Put another way, courts would interpret federal statutes as courts in civil law jurisdictions do.[78](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref78)

In addition, beyond limiting the Court from citing the narrow interpretive holding of a case, Congress might also prevent it from citing its opinions as precedent for the use of interpretive canons, a phenomenon some have called “methodological stare decisis.”[79](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref79) The most famous example of methodological stare decisis is Chevron, which is both a statutory precedent about the meaning of “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act[80](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref80) and a methodological precedent regarding judicial deference toward agency interpretations of statutes.[81](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute" \l "_ftnref81) If Congress banned the Court from citing Chevron, then it would eliminate both the narrow holding and the broader canon—at least as binding precedent.

#### Courts circumvent---particularly on antitrust.

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/)

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

#### Statutory changes fail. Courts won’t listen and will continue to apply the Ninth Circuit’s precedent.

Widiss 20, Deborah A. Widiss is Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Affairs, and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law; (Spring 2020, “Communication Breakdown: How Courts Do — and Don’t — Respond to Statutory Overrides”, https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/how-courts-do-and-dont-respond-to-statutory-overrides/)

Courts and Congress are, at times, engaged in a kind of ongoing “conversation” about statutory law. Congress has exclusive power to enact statutes — but when statutory language is unclear, or doesn’t explicitly resolve a factual question that arises under a statute, courts must resolve the issue through statutory interpretation. Congress then may choose to “override”1 judicial interpretations with which it disagrees (so long as the judicial decision is not constitutional in nature) by amending the law at issue or enacting a new law. The power to enact such overrides is core to maintaining democratic accountability for policy. Enactment of an override, however, is not the end of the story. As new cases arise, courts must assess how the new statutory language has changed the prior legal landscape. And so the exchange continues.

Earlier commentators, including many well-respected judges, have offered thoughtful suggestions for facilitating communication from courts to Congress about problems in statutes that Congress might want to address.2 My research explores the opposite question. How effective is communication from Congress back to courts? The answer is: Not very.3 Even when Congress enacts overrides, courts frequently continue to follow the prior judicial precedent. This is likely due more to information failure than willful disregard of controlling law. Nonetheless, a key aspect of the separation of powers is broken.

My research shows that when the Supreme Court overrules a prior decision, lower courts quickly decrease their reliance on the old precedent and begin to apply the new rule. By contrast, when Congress enacts an override, citation patterns to the prior precedent change very little. Even a decade later, many overridden precedents, or what I have called “shadow precedents,” are still routinely cited as controlling precedent.

This surprising finding may be partially explained by the coding protocols used by leading legal research services. When assessing the viability of precedent, both Westlaw and Lexis consider primarily judicial signals rather than legislative signals; accordingly, it can take several years before a decision is “flagged” as having been affected by later legislation. Even when aware of an override, legal actors sometimes fail to follow the new statutory standard. Luckily, this problem is easy to address. Courts need to start their research with the statutory language itself, rather than a judicial gloss on the statutory language. Sometimes there are difficult interpretive questions regarding the scope of an override, but often it’s just a matter of carefully considering whether the operative language supersedes any aspect of a prior interpretation. By taking this straightforward approach, courts can help ensure that overrides can play their expected role in our tripartite system of government.

Courts Often Rely on Overridden Precedents

Congressional overrides are typically described as the legislative equivalent of a judicial overruling. My study with Professor Brian Broughman was the first to empirically test this characterization. We constructed a database of Supreme Court decisions that had been overruled by later Supreme Court decisions; Supreme Court decisions that had been overridden by later statutory amendments; and a “control” group of Supreme Court decisions that were similar (in terms of subject matter, year of decision, and other factors) to the overruled and overridden decisions but that had not been repudiated by subsequent judicial or legislative actions.4 We then used Lexis’s Shepard’s service to assess how often each Supreme Court case in our database was cited by other courts, generally looking at a 15-year window that spanned from five years prior to the superseding “event” — either overruling or overriding — to ten years after it.5 Although citation counts are admittedly a somewhat blunt measure, they are frequently used in legal and political science studies as a rough gauge of the ongoing precedential weight of a prior decision. By collecting citation data from several years before the superseding event, we were able to establish a “baseline” citation pattern, which we could then compare to citation levels after the overruling or the override. We hypothesized that citation patterns could be expected to change in two different ways: “positive” or “neutral” citations would be expected to decline, and “negative” citations, such as an indication that the prior decision had been fully or partially overruled or superseded, would be expected to increase. To capture both of these effects, we developed a measure we called “net citations,” which we defined as the number of positive or neutral citations to a decision, minus the number of warning or other negative citations.6 We then compared the average number of net citations a case received each year after the event to the average number of net citations the case received before the event; this ratio measures how much effect the overruling or override had on citation levels.

Our findings were striking. As shown in Figure 1, after a judicial overruling, net citations to the prior decision drop rapidly when compared to the pre-event baseline. The citation patterns for cases in our “overridden” category, by contrast, are very similar to those of our control group. Overall levels of citations drop, but in a gradual fashion that is typical of the natural “depreciation” that decisions generally experience over time.7

Even ten years after an override is enacted, most overridden precedents are still widely cited as controlling precedent.

Degree of Overruling or Override. We recognize that an override may supersede some, but not all, of the analysis in a prior decision, meaning other aspects of the decision remain controlling. The same, of course, is true for a judicial overruling. To assess whether this affected our results, the cases were assigned a “depth” measure that evaluated how completely the overruling Supreme Court decision or overriding legislation rejected the prior opinion,8 as well as an “explicitness” measure that evaluated how explicit the Court or Congress was about its disapproval of the prior opinion. We found that for both sets of cases, greater “depth” was associated with a larger decline in citations; however, at each level of “depth,” citations to overruled cases declined more dramatically than citations to the overridden cases. The same was true for “explicitness.” Thus, our findings are not the result of comparing deep and explicit overrulings to shallow and non-explicit overrides. Rather, even when we control for these factors, we find that judicial overrulings have considerably more effect on future citations than legislative overrides.

As an additional robustness check, for a randomly selected subset of cases in both groups, we hand-coded individual headnotes to distinguish between headnotes identifying portions of the prior decision that had been superseded and those that had not. Since Lexis’s Shepard’s service tracks citations to each headnote in a case, this allowed us to assess in a more fine-grained manner which propositions within each case were being referenced when later decisions cited to the earlier precedents. For both groups of cases, we found a notable decline in net citations to the headnotes associated with specific propositions within the cases that had been superseded, but again this decrease was much more pronounced for the overruled cases than the overridden cases. Additionally, we assessed the extent to which ideological preferences might explain ongoing citation of overridden precedents, but our data did not suggest a judge’s ideology was the driving factor.9

Prospectivity. Because a judicial overruling is a reinterpretation of existing law, it typically takes effect immediately; the Court’s new interpretation will apply to all pending disputes, including those arising out of events that pre-dated the new opinion. By contrast, statutory overrides are typically prospective; the old (now superseded) judicial standard will govern the resolution of a dispute arising out of events that pre-date the effective date of the statutory amendment, even if the decision in the case is issued after the effective date of the amendment. For this reason, we would expect to see a judicial overruling have a more immediate effect on net citation levels than a statutory override. To address this issue, our analysis excluded citation counts from the year of the superseding event and the first two years after the superseding event, as this is the window when we expect the difference between retroactive judicial overrulings and prospective statutory overrides to be most salient. We modified these parameters to exclude greater and fewer years, but our general results held, suggesting that the differences we observe are not driven by the prospective nature of overrides.10

Since this study relies on citation counts, rather than a close reading of the context for each citation, we cannot definitively assert that any particular citation of an overridden case was in error. Below, I provide specific examples, drawn from my work on overrides in the employment discrimination context, of both “proper” and “improper” citations to overridden cases. The big picture conclusion is clear, however. If overrides were having the effect that they are intended to have, it is reasonable to assume that there would be sizeable decline in citations to legislatively overridden precedents, just as there is a sizeable decline in citations to judicially overruled precedents. Instead, on average, citation patterns to the overridden cases are almost indistinguishable from those to the comparison control group of cases that have been neither overridden nor overruled. This suggests that often courts fail to hear — or to heed — Congress’s side of the dialogue.

## DA — BizCon

#### Business confidence low.

Goll 8/24/21, \*Vince Goll; (August 24th, 2021, “US business confidence slows to an eight month low on supply woes”, https://www.independent.ie/business/world/us-business-confidence-slows-to-an-eight-month-low-on-supply-woes-40780967.html)

US business activity continues to downshift, with growth slowing to an eight-month low in August against a backdrop of materials shortages, a lack of labor and an upswing in coronavirus infections.

The IHS Markit flash August composite index of purchasing managers at services and manufacturers dropped to 55.4 from 59.9 a month earlier, the group reported yesterday. Readings above 50 indicate growth and the gauge has decreased each month since hitting a record 68.7 in May.

The pullback this month underscores the extent to which supply chain disruptions are hammering firms already struggling to meet demand. Service providers and manufacturers continue to face challenges attracting workers and obtaining the supplies they need.

At factories, for instance, an IHS gauge of supplier deliveries showed the longest lead times in records back to 2007.

"Not only have supply chain delays hit a new survey record high, but the August survey saw increasing frustrations in relation to hiring," Chris Williamson, chief business economist at IHS Markit, said.

"Jobs growth waned to the lowest since July of last year as companies either failed to find suitable staff or existing workers switched jobs."

Limited capacity is translating into sustained inflationary pressures as well. The group's composite index of input prices increased in August to the second-highest reading in data back to 2009. A measure of prices received also advanced, indicating companies are having some success passing along higher costs.

The IHS Markit index of services activity declined to show the slowest pace of growth since December, while a measure of new business dropped to a one-year low.

#### Turn---antitrust intervention strengthens business confidence---no evidence supports the DA.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

Other commentators believe that there are strong policy arguments against employing antitrust law to police the conduct of SSOs because it will undermine the incentives of SSO participants to innovate. For example, David Teece and Edward Sherry have argued that “antitrust intervention” could “re-duce the clarity of [SSO] rules thereby making participation in SSOs more risky and reducing the willingness of firms with valuable IP (and which there-fore presumably have much to contribute to selecting the appropriate standard) to participate.”44 As a result, they contend that there is a “significant risk of slowing down the standards-setting process, thus delaying the adoption of new standards and new products made in accordance with those standards, to the detriment of consumers and of society generally.”45 In effect, Teece and Sherry’s concern is one of delay—antitrust enforcement could delay innovation. In a commentary accompanying Teece and Sherry’s article, Michael Carrier found their claims to be overstated because they failed to engage in any serious antitrust analysis.46 We agree. But more importantly, Teece and Sherry make empirical claims without any evidence. In particular, they do not even offer anecdotal evidence that firms are discouraged from participating in SSOs because of the prospect of antitrust enforcement. Indeed, the opposite could be equally argued: participation in SSOs would be discouraged to the extent that participants could not rely on the commitments of their fellow participants to disclose and abide by other commitments intended to preclude opportunism. Teece and Sherry’s argument sounds a familiar refrain against antitrust: antitrust enforcement discourages procompetitive behavior and therefore should be limited. The conclusion rings hollow without facts.

#### Biden executive order outweighs.

Posner 21, professor at the University of Chicago Law School (Eric, 7-21-2021, "The Antitrust War’s Opening Salvo", Project Syndicate, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-antitrust-executive-order-what-it-does-by-eric-posner-2021-07>)

CHICAGO – US President Joe Biden’s new executive order on “Promoting Competition in the American Economy” is more significant for what it says than for what it does. In fact, the order doesn’t actually order anything. Rather, it “encourages” federal agencies with authority over market competition to use their existing legal powers to do something about the growing problem of monopoly and cartelization in the United States. In some cases, the relevant agencies are asked merely to “consider” ramping up enforcement; in others, they are directed to issue regulations, but the content of those regulations remains largely up to them.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the order’s tentative language as mere rhetoric. Antitrust is the main body of law governing market competition in the US, and it has been the object of sustained attack by business interests and conservative intellectuals for more than 50 years. Biden is the first president since Harry Truman to take a strong public [anti-monopoly stand](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/new-brandeisians-antitrust-for-big-tech-by-eric-posner-2021-06), and he has backed it up by [appointing](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/20/biden-picks-doj-antitrust-chief-500310) ardent anti-monopoly advocates to his government.

The executive order is ambitious in its scope and style. In strongly worded passages, it accuses businesses of monopolistic and unfair practices in major industries, including technology, agriculture, health care, and telecommunications. It laments the decline of government antitrust enforcement, and identifies numerous harms that have resulted – including economic stagnation and rising inequality.

The order also establishes a new bureaucratic organization in the White House to lead the anti-monopoly effort. Demanding a “whole-of-government” approach, it calls on the vast resources of numerous agencies, and not just the two that traditionally oversee antitrust (the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission).

## DA — Court Politics

#### Turn---the Ninth Circuit rejected well-established Supreme Court principles.

Shapiro & Lemley 20, \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy Emeritus at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley; \*Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor at Stanford Law School and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP; (2020, “THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN PREVENTING PATENT HOLDUP”, https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patentholdup.pdf)

The Ninth Circuit reversed, making basic errors of both economics and law. 138 On the economics, the Ninth Circuit mistakenly concluded that “Qualcomm’s royalties are ‘chip-supplier neutral’ because Qualcomm collects them from all OEMs that license its patents, not just ‘rival’s customers.’”139 This is flatly incorrect, because the royalty surcharge reduces the gains from trade between an OEM and a rival modem-chip supplier but does not reduce the gains from trade between the OEM and Qualcomm.140 Based on this error, the Ninth Circuit states incorrectly: “The FTC identifies no such harm to competition.”141

On the law, the Ninth Circuit rejects the well-established principle that harming customers can be a way of harming competition: “[T]he primary harms the district court identified here were to the OEMs who agree to pay Qualcomm’s royalty rates—that is, Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors. These harms were thus located outside the ‘areas of effective competition’—the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips.”142 The notion that harms to customers in the relevant market are outside the scope of the antitrust laws is simply bizarre.

#### It blatantly disregarded Supreme Court precedent.

Errick 20, \*Kirsten Errick, a reporter at Law Street Media, an online legal newsfeed. Research, write, and edit stories; (October 29th, 2020, “Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing En Banc In FTC v. Qualcomm Antitrust Suit”, https://lawstreetmedia.com/tech/ninth-circuit-denies-rehearing-en-banc-in-ftc-v-qualcomm-antitrust-suit/)

In September, the FTC filed a [petition](https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/US_Court_of_Appeals_Ninth_Circuit/19-16122/FTC_v._Qualcomm_Inc/256/) for a rehearing en banc. The FTC argued that the panel “disregarded precedent” by “elevating patent-law labels over economic substance,” “holding that facially ‘neutral’ fees cannot violate the antitrust laws,” and “holding that harms to Qualcomm’s customers are ‘beyond the scope of antitrust law’ and demanding a showing of ‘direct’ harm to competitors.” Specifically, the FTC claimed that the Supreme Court “repeatedly instructed that the Sherman Act ‘is aimed at substance rather than form’…and that court must look beyond labels to ‘the economic reality of the relevant transactions.’” As a result, the FTC asserted that the appellate court should have determined that the so-called patent royalties were not royalties, but rather to secure its chip monopoly, as Judge Lucy Koh in the Northern District of California found. Notably, the problem is that Qualcomm’s “royalties” conceal a chip-driven surcharge that is the economic equivalent of the fees in United Shoe and Caldera…Just like those fees, the surcharge is extracted through monopoly power and penalizes purchases of competing products,” which the FTC argued is anticompetitive. However, the FTC claimed that the Ninth Circuit the “panel declared that because Qualcomm has concealed its surcharge in a ‘patent royalty,’ the entire payment is subject to challenge only ‘in patent law, not antitrust law.’” Moreover, this contradicts the economic substance reasoning. Additionally, the FTC proffered that the Ninth Circuit mischaracterized the surcharge as “chip neutral” and that “‘by definition’ a facially ‘neutral’ charge cannot distort competition.” However, the FTC claimed that this is based “on an erroneous premise… that an OEM pays the same surcharge ‘whether an OEM buys Qualcomm’s chips or a rival’s chips,’” which, according to the FTC, is not true. Lastly, the FTC alleged that the appellate panel “seriously erred” when it dismissed the district court’s “findings about the harm to OEMs – including higher prices that are passed on to retail consumers – because OEMs ‘are Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors.’” The FTC argued that the Ninth Circuit erroneously believed “that such harm is not cognizable because it ‘falls outside the relevant antitrust markets.’” However, the FTC claimed that this is a misstatement of the law. As a result, the FTC sought a rehearing en banc.

#### No link---the plan uses a ‘reasonably necessary’ lens to evaluate anticompetitive conduct, which is consistent with long-held antitrust principles.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

The key antitrust question, therefore, is: how does the law reconcile the legitimate purpose of collaborative standard setting with its likely creation of market power for SEP holders? The answer is found in the fundamental principle of antitrust law that, when firms—and especially competitors—collaborate, even for a legitimate purpose, their collaboration must be no more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable achievement of the legitimate purpose.

This principle has its origins in the common law 67 and in some of the earliest U.S. antitrust cases.68 It means not just that the collaboration in question—for present purposes, SSO rules and practices regarding the creation of standards and the licensing of SEPs—must on balance enhance competition or consumer welfare, but also that the collaboration is unlawful if a different set of rules and practices could largely achieve the intended benefits with less harm.69 As the Court explained in Allied Tube, “[a]n association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to pro- vide . . . safeguards” against conduct by members “with economic interests in restraining competition.”70

This principle has repeatedly been expressed in lower court decisions and antitrust enforcement agency guidelines. In Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, which concerned the lawfulness of a professional association’s rules of practice, the court reasoned as follows: “[A] practice intended to benefit the public may have a collateral adverse effect on competition. If it does, then such a practice must be the least restrictive means of achieving the desired goal and the public benefit rendered must outweigh the adverse effect on competition.”71 And the U.S. enforcement agencies’ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines make clear that when a collaboration among competitors harms competition or creates market power—as the creation by SSOs of monopoly power for SEP holders surely does—that harm must be justified by an offsetting, procompetitive justification.

#### Apple case thumps---it’s politicized, and has ripple effects across antitrust.

Albertgotti 9/10/21, \*[Reed Albergotti](https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/reed-albergotti/), Washington Post; (September 10th, 2021, “Judge’s ruling may take a bite out of Apple’s App Store, but falls short of calling the iPhone maker a monopolist”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/10/apple-epic-decision-judge-market-monopoly/)

A federal judge fundamentally altered Apple’s App Store business model on Friday in a landmark ruling that accused the iPhone maker of illegal anticompetitive behavior and is likely to have ripple effects across the U.S. antitrust landscape.

In a decision on an antitrust lawsuit brought by Fortnite maker Epic Games, U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers ruled that Apple must allow app developers to “steer” customers to alternatives to the tech giant’s payment processing service, which collects a 30 percent fee on most digital transactions. That was previously not allowed by the company, and marks a major victory for developers which have long complained of the tight grip the tech giant holds over its App Store on the roughly one billion iPhones currently in use.

[The blockbuster trial between Apple and the maker of ‘Fortnite’ goes out with a ‘hot tub’ session](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/24/apple-epic-trial-hot-tubbing/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_5)

Gonzalez Rogers also found that Apple was in violation of California state competition laws because of the way it forces developers into using Apple’s payment processing service without allowing them to tell customers there are alternatives, which are often cheaper.

She stopped short of ruling in favor of Epic‘s claims that Apple is a monopolist, although she left the door open by suggesting more evidence could have changed her decision.

“The court does not find that it is impossible; only that Epic Games failed in its burden to demonstrate Apple is an illegal monopolist,” she wrote.

Epic spokeswoman Elka Looks said the company plans to appeal the ruling. Tim Sweeney, chief executive of Epic, said in a tweet that, “Today’s ruling isn’t a win for developers or for consumers.”

Apple did not respond to requests for comment.

The ruling, one of the first major legal actions taken against a tech giant in a new era of antitrust scrutiny, is sure to echo loudly both in Washington, where a legislative effort to rein in the power of Big Tech is underway, and in the courts, which are facing the biggest test of existing antitrust laws in decades. Tech giants have come under the microscope in recent years as it became clear that current antitrust law does not effectively address their power, and regulators and lawmakers have been pushing to change that.

#### 2 — their evidence cites a Mexico City policy that thumps — we read Blue

1NC Emond ’19 [Rachel; September 23; Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Inkstick Media, “How Anti-Choice Policies Increase the Likelihood of War,” <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-anti-choice-policies-increase-the-likelihood-of-war/>]

Ironically, since the Mexico City Policy is cutting off access to family planning services, including contraception, it might actually be increasing demand for abortions. Since its most recent implementation, the Mexico City Policy has already resulted in tens of millions of dollars in [funding cuts](https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/how-a-change-in-us-abortion-policy-reverberated-around-the-globe/?utm_term=.9c3fe386b27f). At the same time, there has been a [40% increase in abortions](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/27/global-gag-rule-africa-abortion-study) in some African countries. Looking ahead, some experts are [estimating](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/24/15681216/trump-budget-cuts-funding-global-family-planning-famine-relief) this policy could [lead](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/24/15681216/trump-budget-cuts-funding-global-family-planning-famine-relief) to 15,000 maternal deaths, 8 million unwanted pregnancies, and up to 26 million fewer women and families with access to contraception and family planning services.

While the Mexico City Policy does not change the total amount of health-related aid appropriated by Congress, the policy considerably weakens the ability that local health providers have to effectively serve their communities. The on-again/off-again nature of the policy causes [extreme instability](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/donor-conditions-and-their-implications-humanitarian-response) among local healthcare providers, many of which are the sole location for such services in a region. This instability [leads to](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/donor-conditions-and-their-implications-humanitarian-response) staff layoffs, higher transaction costs, and confusion about access to care. It also prevents healthcare providers from conducting any long-term planning to better meet the needs of a community.

No matter the intention of its supporters, the Mexico City Policy damages the health care infrastructure in the countries that rely on American aid the most. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflict in these communities and severely undermines American soft power.

Soft power efforts — like the promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights — have been a hallmark of the US foreign policy strategy for the [last 70 years](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44891.pdf).

# 1AR

## Adv — Innovation

#### Their argument is akin to saying speed limits don’t matter because high ways are safe.

Gilbert 20, \*Richard J. Gilbert is an [American Economist](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=American_Economist&action=edit&redlink=1), professor at [UC Berkeley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley) from 1976 to 2000, and founder of [LECG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LECG_Corporation) Corp. ([Law and Economics Consulting Group](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LECG_Corporation)). Richard ('Rich') Gilbert served as Deputy Assistant General in the [Antitrust Division](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice_Antitrust_Division) of the [U.S. Department of Justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice) in the White House from 1993 to 1995. He led the development of Joint Department of [Justice and Federal Trade Commission](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Justice_and_Federal_Trade_Commission&action=edit&redlink=1) [Antitrust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_law) Guidelines for the Licensing of [Intellectual Property](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property) and is currently [Emeritus Professor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor) of Economics at the [University of California at Berkeley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley); (2020, “Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy”, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/innovation-matters)

Conduct that enables a patent owner to evade FRAND commitments should not be lawful. High royalties harm consumers and can impede innovation for technologies for which a patent license is necessary. Some have argued that patent holdup is no more than an academic curiosity because innovation and competition for smartphones and other devices have thrived, despite the fact that these devices implement standards covered by hundreds of SEPs.[26](javascript:void(0)) But this argument is flawed. It does not recognize that prices for smartphones and other devices would likely be much higher if the antitrust authorities and the courts stopped policing FRAND licensing obligations.[27](javascript:void(0)) The fact that it is reasonably safe to drive on highways in the US does not mean that speed limits are unnecessary. FRAND limitations are speed limits on the information superhighway.

#### Even if patent holdup isn’t empirically supported, it still reduces social welfare, so efforts must be taken to limit its effects.

Cotter et al. 19, \*Thomas F. Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Innovators Network Foundation Intellectual Property Fellow; \*Erik Hovenkamp, Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law; \*Norman Siebrasse, Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law; (2019, “Demystifying Patent Holdup”, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4667&context=wlulr)

B. Patent Holdup Is Not a Problem, Because It Is Not Systemic

A second, related argument is that there is no empirical evidence of patent owners engaging in pervasive, systemic patent holdup in the very industries holdup theorists are most concerned with (e.g., telecommunications).139 Indeed, according to the critics, if holdup were pervasive one would expect innovation and growth in the affected industries to “stagnate, wither, or die,”140 whereas if one looks “across human history, it is not clear that the commercialization of complex technologies has ever been faster than it is today in those industries that reform proponents point to as most plagued by the patent holdup ‘problem.’”141

Although we agree that whether, or to what extent, patent holdup occurs in the real world is ultimately an empirical matter, the implication that patent holdup is a problem only if it is “pervasive” or “systemic” is a non sequitur.142 If our analysis above is correct—that the ability to engage in patent holdup depends on path dependence, that settings conducive to patent holdup are not uncommon, and that the three components of a holdup royalty can exist independently of one another—patent holdup does not have to be systemic to be capable of reducing social welfare. Seeing how the empirical critiques of patent holdup do “not claim[ ] that individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior that can be characterized as holdup,”143 the conclusion that holdup is not systemic may well be accurate, for all we know, while still being of any limited relevance for purposes of determining whether injunctive relief should issue on the facts of any one particular case.144 If the choice were between always granting an injunction without tailoring or conditions, and never granting any form of injunctive relief, perhaps the question of whether holdup was systemic, at least in a particular industry, would be central. But the traditional approach to injunctive relief looks to the facts of the particular case.145

Further, rather than the absence of patent holdup serving as a reason for courts to enter injunctions in SEP, PAE, and other cases, it may be that case law imposing limits on the entry of injunctions is itself a leading factor constraining firms from engaging in holdup.146 Again, the question ultimately is an empirical one, but for now we cannot rule out the possibility that legal reforms were necessary to prevent patent holdup from getting worse.

1. *Id.* at 659 ("Third parties who did not participate in the standards-setting activity and had no contact with the patentee would be unable to establish detrimental reliance."). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)